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10.1  Introduction 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we describe and compare the 
gift and bequest (estate) tax systems in the United States and Japan. Second, 
we use tax data to estimate the magnitude of intergenerational  transfers. 
From the description of the bequest and gift tax systems in the two coun- 
tries, we discuss distortions and incentives of those systems. Our findings of 
the economic significance of bequests in household assets hold important im- 
plications for the controversy regarding how much outstanding wealth is the 
result of intergenerational transfers. In Japan and the United States, a substan- 
tial portion of wealth, and especially of land in Japan, is bequeathed from one 
generation to the next. The study of  the transfer tax  system is also timely, 
because in both countries significant revisions have recently been  made or 
have been proposed. 
In the macroeconomic literature of saving, studies have suggested the exis- 
tence of a bequest motive in Japan (Hayashi 1986; Hayashi, Ito, and Slemrod 
1988; Hayashi, Ando, and Fems 1988; Ishikawa  1988; Noguchi, Uemura, 
and Kitoh 1989). Other studies have estimated the magnitude of intergenera- 
tional transfers in the United States (Cox 1990; Hurd 1987; David and Men- 
chik  1979; Menchik  and  David  1983; Bemheim,  Shleifer, and  Summers 
1985). In particular, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981, 707) pointed out that be- 
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quests play an important role in capital accumulation: “American capital ac- 
cumulation  results  primarily  from intergenerational  transfers.”  However,  a 
consensus does not exist about the size and importance of  intergenerational 
transfers as opposed to life-cycle saving in determining outstanding wealth 
(Modigliani 1988 and Kotlikoff 1988 offer opposing views). 
Despite proliferating studies on bequests in the United States, few studies 
have examined the effect of the transfer tax system on bequest  behavior in 
Japan.  (Notable  exceptions  are  Dekle  1989a,  1989b.)  If  the  Kotlikoff- 
Summers effect is strong and universal, is the high saving rate in Japan a result 
of a strong bequest motive combined with its transfer tax system? This paper 
presents an estimate of the amount of wealth transferred by bequest in Japan. 
Although  the estimate is sensitive to assumptions about behavior in nontax- 
able deaths, the estimate  takes  a first step toward  an understanding  of  the 
significance of bequests in Japan. 
To  our best knowledge,  this paper is the first to analyze bequest taxation 
time-series data (collected by tax agencies) of the two countries in a compar- 
ative perspective, and to estimate bequeathed assets in proportion to outstand- 
ing assets from tax data. The approach used in this paper may be contrasted 
with the survey method (Noguchi, Uemura, and Kitoh 1989, for example) or 
the method  of  estimating  lifetime  income  and  consumption  (Kotlikoff  and 
Summers 1981, for example). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 10.2 highlights the 
differences and similarities between the intergenerational  transfer tax systems 
of Japan and the United States. (Detailed descriptions of the two tax systems 
are in the appendices. For the Japanese system, the tax reform of  1988 will be 
discussed as much as possible.)  Section 10.3 shows the compositions of be- 
queathed properties in the two countries. Section 10.4 is devoted to analyzing 
the effects of tax distortions on portfolio behavior in Japan. Section 10.5 and 
10.6 give estimates of the proportion of assets obtained by intergenerational 
transfers in Japan and the United States, respectively. 
10.2  Intergenerational lkansfer Taxes in Japan and the United States 
This section highlights the  similarities and differences of  the bequest tax 
and gift tax  systems of Japan and the  United  States (the inheritance tax in 
Japan and the estate tax in the United States). (Detailed legal descriptions will 
be  found in the appendices and in Ishi  1989, chap.  11  .) All property  of  a 
decedent is subject to the inheritance tax in Japan and to the estate tax in the 
United States. The gift tax in both countries is a tax on the transfer of wealth 
during life. 
10.2.1  Overview 
The basic difference between the inheritance tax in Japan and the estate tax 
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bequest in Japan, while it is imposed on the estate of the decedent (benefactor) 
in the United States. One may think that this is a superficial difference. How- 
ever, the structure of bequest taxation is affected by this philosophical differ- 
ence. In Japan, a progressive rate schedule is applied to each statutory heir 
and then aggregated to calculate the total tax liability. More (statutory) heirs 
for a given estate lessens the total tax liability on the estate. (This was a known 
loophole for the wealthy in Japan prior to 1988. The term “statutory heir” and 
the tax-saving scheme will be explained later.) In the United States, the num- 
ber of heirs is irrelevant in the calculation of the estate tax. The tax is assessed 
progressively  on the value of the estate, regardless of its distribution. In both 
countries,  agricultural land and family business properties benefit from spe- 
cial provisions to lessen their assessment value. In Japan, however, land gen- 
erally is assessed significantly below its market value, partly due to a special 
assessment rate reduction and partly due to assessment in practice. There is 
no such provision in the United States. Such undervaluation  of land should 
create some tax-induced portfolio shifting among bequest-minded elderly Jap- 
anese. This point will be examined later in this section. 
The basic philosophies of the gift tax in relation to the bequest tax are rather 
different between Japan and the United States. The gift tax in Japan is defined 
as complementary  to the bequest tax, with  the intent to prevent inter vivos 
transfers that are meant to lessen the bequest tax. In the United States, the gift 
and  estate taxes are, in  principle,  a unified transfer tax system in that one 
progressive tax is imposed on the cumulative transfers during the lifetime and 
at death. In sum, the gift tax in Japan discourages inter vivos transfers, while 
the gift tax in the United States is integrated in a unified tax schedule on inter- 
generational transfers, not discriminating, in theory, inter vivos and postmor- 
tem transfers. 
In both countries,  it is possible to take advantage of  a basic deduction per 
transfer in the gift tax system, by making a small gift each year for many years 
in order to reduce bequest (inheritance or estate) tax liability. However, the 
extent of this loophole is more limited in Japan than in the United States. In 
Japan, this basic deduction for a tax-free gift is Y600,OOO ($4,000) per recip- 
iant,  while  in  the  United  States, an  individual  can make  annual  gifts  of 
$10,000 to any other individual without being subject to tax. Couples jointly 
can make $20,000 of tax-free gifts to each recipient. In both countries, gifts 
within three years prior to death are recaptured as inheritance or part of  the 
estate and are subject to the bequest or estate tax. (See details in appendices.) 
In  the  United  States,  the  difference  in  calculating  tax  liability  on a  tax- 
inclusive or tax-exclusive basis makes the gift tax liability less than the estate 
tax liability. (See details in appendix B.) 
In both countries, the bequest and gift taxes are presumed, in principle, to 
be taxes on intergenerational transfers. There are various credits on transfers 
within the generation and penalties on transfers to recipients other than lineal 
descendants.  However, the manner in which this principle is reflected in the 238  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
tax code is different in the two countries. In Japan, the Civil Code guarantees 
a spouse, a son, or a daughter a minimum share of the bequest (50 percent of 
the “statutory” share, explained in appendix A). This is a direct intervention, 
rather than a tax incentive, on the composition of  intergenerational transfers. 
In the United States, there is no legal provision designating to whom or how 
much of a bequest is to be given. 
From the principle of taxing intergenerational transfers, the United States’ 
estate and gift tax system makes any transfers, inter vivos or upon death, to a 
spouse tax-exempt. In Japan, there is a limit on the size of a tax-free bequest 
or gift to a spouse. A relatively large tax credit is available for a bequest to a 
spouse. In effect, the greater of half of the decedent’s property, regardless of 
size, and Y80 million ($533,333)  may be bequeathed to a spouse tax-free. In 
the case of gifts, a gift of (own) residential housing valued up to Y  20 million 
($133,333) may be transferred to a “longtime spouse” (once per marriage of 
twenty  years  or  more).  Beyond  this  amount,  theoretically  even  between 
spouses, gifts are taxable. 
In theory, transfer taxes should apply to a family’s wealth once per genera- 
tion. Transfer of  wealth from a grandfather to a grandchild would be  taxed 
twice in a normal succession of bequests. Hence, there is a penalty for skip- 
ping generations in transfers in both countries. In Japan, if  an asset is be- 
queathed to a grandchild, a 20 percent surcharge over the normal tax liability 
is imposed. No such penalty exists for gift taxation. In the United States, a 
flat rate of  tax equal to the highest rate of the estate tax (55 percent) after 
allowing  a  $1  million  exemption  per  taxpayer  would  be  imposed  on  a 
generation-skipping transfer (bequest or gift) in addition to payment of gift or 
estate tax. In  both countries, if  the grandchild’s parent has predeceased the 
grandparent, the generation-skipping tax does not apply. 
10.2.2  “Statutory Heirs” and “Statutory Shares” in Japan 
The Japanese civil law concept of “statutory heir” is critical to an under- 
standing of  the Japanese inheritance tax. We  concentrate on the case where 
there are surviving children. (For other cases, see appendix A.) 
Suppose that a spouse and two children survive the decedent. They consti- 
tute three statutory heirs, and the spouse has a statutory share of one-half and 
each child has a statutory share of  one-fourth. In  the case of  a spouse and 
three children, that is, four statutory heirs, each child has a statutory share of 
one-sixth. If  the spouse predeceased and three children are alive, each child 
has a statutory share of one-third. 
It is presumed in the civil law that, unless otherwise designated, one-half 
of the estate goes to the spouse and each child receives an equal share of the 
remainder. Moreover, one-half of the statutory share is a guaranteed bequest. 
For example, assume a spouse and two children survive the decedent; the 
spouse is entitled to no less than one-quarter and each child is entitled to no 
less than one-eighth of the property. Even if the decedent leaves a will desig- 239  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of Household Wealth 
nating a sole recipient for the entire estate, statutory heirs may  sue for their 
automatic entitlement. More important, regardless of  the actual distribution 
of  property, the number of  statutory heirs and statutory shares determine the 
total inheritance tax liability. (See appendix A for details.) 
10.2.3  Bequest Taxable Property, Exemption, and Tax Base 
In principle, a decedent’s gross estate (property value) is the market value 
of  all the decedent’s assets. (A notable deviation, which we  will explain in 
detail shortly, involves the assessment of land in Japan.) We  note several pro- 
visions that define what constitutes a decedent’s assets and how  to value as- 
sets. In Japan, a decedent’s property includes a portion of his or her lump-sum 
severance (retirement) payment in excess of  Y  5 million times the number of 
statutory heirs. (Severance payments, prevalent among all corporations, have 
been traditional in lieu of pension or annuity plans, and are on the order of 
two or three times annual salary.) In Japan, any gifts within three years prior 
to death are deemed to be bequeathed property. 
Conditions under which proceeds from a decedent’s life insurance policy 
are included are different between the two countries. In Japan, if  premiums 
had been paid by the decedent, the policy is bequeathed property. In general, 
if  a daughter pays a share of the premiums of her father’s life insurance, that 
share of  the proceeds is exempted from bequeathed property. However, the 
amount of  % 5 million times the number of statutory heirs is deductible from 
the property value calculation for life insurance. 
In  the United States, a decedent’s gross estate includes the proceeds of  a 
life insurance policy on the decedent’s life if either (1) the proceeds are receiv- 
able by the executor or administrator or payable to the estate; or (2) the dece- 
dent at his or her death (or within three years of death) possessed any “inci- 
dents of ownership” in the policy. Incidents of ownership include the power to 
change the beneficiary of the policy, to assign the policy, to borrow against its 
cash surrender value, and to surrender or cancel it. 
The gross estate does not include the proceeds of a life insurance policy if 
the decedent, at least three years prior to death, irrevocably designates bene- 
ficiaries of the policy and transfers all other incidents of ownership to another 
person. This exclusion holds even if  the decedent pays all policy premiums. 
In Japan, such a policy would be included in decedent’s bequeathed property. 
Both in the United States and in Japan, there is substantially favorable treat- 
ment for farm property and the assets of  family businesses. This provides a 
tax benefit to small family businesses. In the United States, an executor may 
elect to have certain real property used in farming and other closely held busi- 
nesses valued at its current use, rather than at fair market value, for estate tax 
purposes. In Japan, only agriculture qualifies for this special provision, but 
land value of  family business properties may benefit from the underassess- 
ment of land to be explained below. 
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qualifying property based on the present discounted value of its current cash 
flow, rather than at its highest and best use. For example, the value of a farm 
on the outskirts of an urban area may be based on the present discounted value 
of the current cash flow generated by its crops, rather than on the land’s value 
to a developer who would build suburban housing. 
This provision is virtually the same in Japan. The difference comes in the 
qualification for this special treatment. In the United States, the decedent or a 
member of the family must have used the property in its qualifying use (farm- 
ing or family business) in at least five of the eight years prior to death. The 
property must be bequeathed to a member of  the decedent’s family, and that 
beneficiary must use the property in its current use in each of the succeeding 
ten years. The beneficiary must actively participate in the property’s use and 
cannot be an absentee landlord. In Japan, the qualification is that the decedent 
was engaged in agriculture at the time of  death and the successor in family 
agriculture must be engaged in farming by the time of inheritance tax  filing 
(within six months after death) and continue farming for twenty years. Failure 
to comply with the posttransfer requirements triggers a recapture of the benefit 
of the special valuation in both countries. 
There are several deductions and exemptions. First, in the United States, 
the law permits an unlimited deduction for transfers between spouses. (In Ja- 
pan, the favorable treatment of transfers to the spouse is technically done via 
tax credit, not deduction.) In addition, transfers and bequests to charities (to 
organizations certified by  the Internal Revenue Service in the United States, 
and organizations specially defined as public welfare (interest) corporations in 
Japan) are deductible. Funeral and burial (or cremation) expenses and any 
liabilities are deductible in both countries. Expenses of  administration of the 
estate are also deductible in the United States. 
A minimum bequest amount escapes taxation regardless of  other exemp- 
tions and deductions. Currently, in Japan the amount of  Y40 million plus Y  8 
million times the number of  statutory heirs is deducted from the property 
value. If a spouse and two children survived the decedent, bequests valued up 
to  %64 million  ($426,666) are tax  free.  A  similar arrangement  is  done 
through a tax credit in the United States. In effect, bequests valued up to about 
$600,000 are tax free. 
10.2.4  Tax Rate Schedule, Tax Credit, and Surcharge in Japan 
In Japan, the total amount of inheritance tax owed by all heirs is determined 
as follows. First, assign the total tax base (property values after all deductions 
and exemptions) to each statutory heir by the statutory share (defined above). 
Then apply the tax schedule shown in table 10.1 to the assigned amount for 
each heir (that is, the total tax base times statutory share) to calculate a tax 
amount for each heir. Deduct any tax credit (to be explained shortly) from this 
individual tax amount. Then sum the individual tax amounts to arrive at the 
total inheritance tax liability. The total tax liability is independent of the actual 241  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10.1  Inheritance Tax Table in Japan (in millions of yen) 
Old Schedule, 1975-87  New Schedule, 1988-present 
Plus  Plus 
Taxable  MTR on  Taxable  MTR on 
Transfer  But Less  Excess  Transfer  But Less  Excess 












































































































Nofe:  MTR = marginal tax rate. 
division of property, and the actual inheritance may differ from that which the 
statutory shares presume. Then actual tax liabilities are adjusted in propor- 
tion. (Appendix A gives an example of how to calculate and distribute inheri- 
tance tax liability.) 
The tax rate schedule starts at 10 percent for the first Y4  million ($26,000). 
The marginal rate goes up to 70 percent at Y500 million ($3.3 million). How- 
ever, note again that this rate schedule is applied to a property value divided 
by statutory share. 
In Japan the surviving spouse, minors, and the handicapped receive a tax 
credit. First, the surviving spouse receives a special tax credit. If a surviving 
spouse inherits property, she or he may deduct from the inheritance tax liabil- 
ity the following amount: 
Min (max [ Y80 million, spouse’s 
statutory share times taxable 
property value], value of  property 




= inheritance  x 
Total taxable property value 
To  understand  the formula with respect to the spouse’s tax liability, it is 
instructive to consider several examples. Assume a spouse and two children 
survive the decedent. If the spouse actually inherits less than the estate statu- 
tory share (one-half), the inherited amount is free from inheritance tax, how- 242  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
ever large the property is. Even if  the spouse actually inherits more than the 
statutory share, if the bequest to the spouse is less than Y  80 million, however 
large a share of estate it may constitute, it is free from inheritance tax. 
Second, minors and the handicapped receive a tax credit. (See appendix A 
for details.) Third, any gifts that were made within three years of death are 
deemed inheritance. In order to avoid double taxation, the gift tax paid for 
such gifts is credited against the inheritance tax. Fourth, if the decedent was a 
beneficiary of an inheritance within the ten years prior to death, an additional 
tax credit applies. 
If  a beneficiary is not a child (or a grandchild if there are no children), a 
parent, or  a spouse of a child (or a grandchild if there are no children), then 
there is a 20 percent surcharge on the amount of  tax  calculated above. So 
marginal rates for unrelated beneficiaries can exceed 80 percent. As explained 
above, this provision works to the disadvantage of  generation-skipping be- 
quests and lucky strangers. 
10.2.5  Tax Rate Schedule, Tax Credit, and Surcharge in the United States 
Under present law in the United States, the gift and estate tax rates begin at 
18 percent on the first $10,000 of taxable transfers and reach 55 percent on 
transfers over $3 million (table 10.2). In addition, for transfers between $10 
million and $21.04 million, the benefits of  the lower rates and the unified 
schedule are phased out at a rate of  5 percent, creating an effective marginal 
tax rate of 60 percent. This schedule is applied to the estate, unlike the case 
of Japan, so that a direct comparison of tables 10.1 and 10.2 is meaningless. 
The cumulative amount of  any gift or estate tax  is reduced by  a unified 
credit. The gift or estate tax is computed without any exemption, and then the 
unified credit is subtracted to determine the amount of gift or estate tax pay- 
able before the allowance of other credits. The present amount of the credit is 
$192,800, which has the effect of exempting the first $600,000 of  transfers 
from gift and estate tax. As a consequence, the first dollar of a taxable estate 
faces a 37 percent marginal tax rate. The unified  credit is not indexed for 
inflation. Tax  liability accounts for any prior gift taxes paid or unified credit 
claimed. 
A limited credit is available for any state death or inheritance taxes paid. 
The state credit works as revenue sharing with the states, encouraging them to 
establish a death tax at least to soak up the benefit of the dollars that the federal 
government would otherwise tax. In Japan, there are no additional inheritance 
taxes at the prefecture (local) level. 
While the credit is unified, the rate structure is not. The estate tax is calcu- 
lated on a tax inclusive basis while the gift tax is calculated on a tax exclusive 
basis. This implies that  the effective tax rate on gifts may be  significantly 
lower than the effective tax rate on bequests, when the same amount of gift or 
1.  The formula is complicated. The interested reader is referred to a detailed tax book (Minis- 
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Table 10.2  Unified Estate and Gift Tax Rate for U.S. Citizens and Residents 
(in dollars) 
Taxable Transfer  Plus MTR on 
More Than  But Less Than  Tax  Excess (%) 
0  10,000  0  18 
10,000  20,000  1,800  20 
20,000  40,000  3,800  22 
40,000  60,000  8,200  24 
60,000  80,000  13,000  26 
80,000  100,000  18,200  28 
100,000  150,000  23,800  30 
150,000  250,000  38,800  32 
250,000  500,000  70,800  34 
500,000  750,000  155,800  37 
750,000  1,000,000  248,300  39 
1,000,000  1,250,000  345,800  41 
1,250,000  1,500,000  448,300  43 
1,500,000  2,000,000  555,800  45 
2,000,000  2,500,000  780,800  49 
2,500,000  3,000,000  1,025,800  53 
3,000,000  -  1,290,800  55 
bequest inclusive of tax liabilities is transferred. (See appendix B for an ex- 
ample.) 
10.3  Composition of Bequest: Japan versus the United States 
10.3.1  Composition of Wealth of Decedents in Japan 
Table  10.3 shows property values, various exemptions, credits, and sur- 
charges in  1977, 1987, and  1988 in Japan. Significant revision of  the rate 
schedule, basic exemption, and tax credits occurred between 1987 and 1988 
(detailed in appendix A). Bequeathed property values (equivalent to the gross 
estate in the United States) changed significantly from 1977 to 1987, under 
the same rate structure. This reflects both bracket creep due to inflation and 
wealth accumulation among the wealthy, in particular a rapid inflation in land 
prices. (See section 10.4.2 for an analysis of the composition of bequeathed 
property.) 
Table  10.4 shows the time series of outstanding assets and liabilities of the 
household sector at year end. The value of  landholdings and land’s share of 
total assets also are shown. Land accounts for about one-half of the value of 
outstanding household assets in Japan. The ratio fluctuates according to land’s 
price relative to other prices. The relative land price was much higher in 1973 
and 1987 than in other years. 
Table  10.5 shows the composition of  bequeathed assets from data of  the 244  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
Table 10.3  Inheritance Tax Record (in billions of yen) 
1977  1987  1988 
Property value 
Minus liability and funeral 
Plus gifts within three years 
(Basic exemption) 
Inheritance tax before sur. 
charge and credit 
Plus 20% surcharge 
Gift tax (credit) 
Spouse provision (credit) 
Minors (credit) 
Handicapped (credit) 
Two in ten years (credit) 
Tax base 
Net inheritance tax 
2,002.220 






































Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, Tax Bureau Statistics Annual (1977, 1988, 1989). 
Notes: Years apply to those who died in that year (and whose filings were done by  the end of 
June, the deadline for those who died on December 31 of the preceding year). Only those who 
were required to file are reported. Corrections in filing included. 
Tax  Bureau. Only those bequeathed assets belonging to a decedent whose 
heirs were subject to nonzero inheritance tax are reported here, as “taxable 
deaths.” In Japan, those who do not pay the inheritance tax are not required to 
report to the Tax Bureau’s office, except for a spouse who benefits from the 
special spouse tax credit to become nontaxable. 
Among bequeathed assets, land predominates. Its share fluctuates between 
65 and 69 percent. Securities account for only 10 to 13 percent. This table is 
an  underestimation of  what  was  really  transferred from  the  decedents of 
1976-88 to the next generation. First, only taxable deaths are covered. There 
are many decedents whose heirs did not  have to pay  inheritance taxes either 
because bequests were small or because the number of  heirs was large. Sec- 
ond, land value reported in this table grossly underestimates the true market 
value. As explained in section 10.4.2, the assessed value is in practice one- 
half to two-thirds of the market value. There is also a special provision for an 
additional 50 percent exemption for small residential lots. In fact, this incen- 
tive makes land a favorite vehicle of bequest in Japan. 
10.3.2  United States 
Table  10.6 shows the composition of  wealth reported on U.S. estate tax 
returns filed in  1985. In the majority of cases these returns represent wealth 
transfers resulting from deaths in 1984. The nearly 68,000 federal estate tax 
returns  filed  in  1985 represent less than 3.5 percent of  total deaths in the 
United States in  1984. Those estates subject to tax represented less than 1.5 245  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10.4  Household Outstanding Assets and Liability at the End of Year 
(in billions of yen) 
~ 
Assets  Land (% of  assets)  Liability  Net Assets 





































































67,15  1.6 
78,002.6 




























Source: Economic Planning Agency (1990 and various issues) 
percent of total deaths in the United States in 1984. The table is largely self- 
explanatory. The unified nature of the U.S.  transfer tax system is exhibited by 
the inclusion of  taxable lifetime transfers (gifts) in the gross estate. These 
represent 11.4 percent of  the gross estate. The importance of the marital de- 
duction is seen in that one-third of the value of gross estates for which returns 
were filed was exempted from tax by the marital deduction. Appendix B con- 
tains similar data for returns filed in  1977,  1982,  1983,  1984,  1986,  1987, 
and 1988. 
For comparison purposes, table  10.7  presents estimates of  aggregate net Table 10.5  Composition of Bequeathed Assets, Japan Taxable Death Only (in billions of yen; shares of total in parentheses) 
Total  Funeral  Bequest 
Year  Land’  Structuresb  Businessc  Securitiesd  Cask  Miscellaneous  Assets  Liabilities  Expenses  Tax 
1973  1,220.5 
(70.95) 
1974  1,437.8 
(71.53) 
Tax reform 
1975  1,121.0 
(70.38) 
1976  1,205.6 
(68.28) 
1977  1,349.1 
(67.78) 
1978  1,538.8 
(67.04) 
1979  1,728.8 
(66.33) 
1980  2,144.0 
(66.91) 







































































































74.5  16.7 
90.9  20.1 
102.2  24.3 
120.9  29.2 
153.1  34.8 
169.6  44.3 









672.0 1982  3,331.0 
(70.17) 
1983  3,656.0 
(68.98) 
1984  3,918.8 
(67.52) 
1985  4,437.4 
(66.63) 
1986  4,682.6 
(64.45) 
1987  5,747.3 
(64.16) 
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417.3  371.0 
(8.79)  (7.81) 
501.6  425.9 
(9.46)  (8.03) 
563.7  483.0 
(9.71)  (8.32) 
703.3  576.3 
(10.56)  (8.65) 
868.4  664.4 
(1 1.95)  (9.14) 
1,152.3  811.1 
(  1 2.86)  (9.05) 
1,220.9  911.3 
(1  1.41)  (8.51) 
430.6  4,746.4  247.9  63.2  809.6 
(9.07) 
496.6  5,299.6  269.7  71.6  914.6 
(9.37) 
570.4  5,803.1  350.6  79.9  979.1 
(9.82) 
653.3  6,659.2  382.0  92.8  1,158.4 
(9.81) 
715.1  7.265.0  465.4  101.3  1,277.4 
(9.84) 
850.6  8,956.6  653.1  120.6  1,68  1.2 
(9.49) 
737.7  10,699.3  755.8  113.3  1,833.8 
(6.89) 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax  Bureau, Tax Bureau Statisrics Annual (various issues) 
'Including residential, rice paddy, field, and forest. 
bIncluding houses. 
<Family  business property 
dIncluding bonds and stocks. 
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Table 10.6  U.S. Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1985 
Returns  Value 
Millions of 
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Adjusted taxable estate 
Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
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Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income Division. 
'Number not disclosed to retain taxpayer confidentiality. 
worth by major components for the United States based on the Survey of Con- 
sumer Finance (SCF, 1983 data), the Panel Study in Income Dynamics (PSID, 
1984 data) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP, 1984 
data). Note that in the table secured debt is netted from the reported asset. By 
these data, bequeathable wealth reported on estate tax returns made up  be- 
tween 0.6 and 1.0 percent of  private national wealth. This, of  course, is an 249  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of Household Wealth 
Table 10.7  Estimates of Aggregate Net Worth and Major Components 
(in billions of dollars) 
~  ~~ 
SCF  PSID  SIPP 
Vehicle equity  308  503  410 
House equity  2,904  2,573  2,683 
Other real estate equity  1,640  1,170  783 
Liquid assets  1,032  1,204  965’ 
IRAs, Keoghs  149 
Common stock mutual funds  1,056  709  466 
Farm/business equity  2,391  1,436  843 
Other assets  1,260  820  365 
Other debt  227  159  240 
Net worth  10,505  8,254  6,401 
-  b  125 
Nore:  PSID  = Panel  Study in  Income Dynamics (1984 data), SCF =  Survey of  Consumer 
Finance (1983 data), SIPP = Survey of  Income and Program Participation (1984 data). 
‘Includes corporate, municipal, and tradable federal debt, which  are included in “Other assets” 
in the SCF and PSID data. The SCF total for such bonds is $314 billion. 
bIncluded partly in liquid assets, partly in common stock 
underestimate. Those who file estate tax returns represent a small percentage 
of all decedents, albeit the wealthiest of all decedents. At this aggregate level, 
bequeathable wealth appears to represent a larger fraction of  total national 
wealth in the United States than in Japan. 
10.4  Distortions in the Japanese Inheritance Tax 
10.4.1  Token Adoption 
It is apparent from the calculation of the inheritance tax that the number of 
statutory heirs plays an important role. The number of statutory heirs need not 
equal the true number of heirs. Having more statutory heirs reduces total in- 
heritance taxes imposed upon  actual heirs. This is independent of  how  the 
decedent actually divides his or her property. Three features of the inheritance 
tax produce this result. First, the basic exemption depends on the number of 
statutory heirs. Second, the total property value after exemptions is divided 
by the number of statutory heirs before a progressive tax schedule is applied. 
Third, a tax credit for life insurance payment and severance payment depends 
on the number of statutory heirs. 
Hence, a family may reduce inheritance tax liability by  adopting children 
to  increase the  number of  statutory heirs,  with  an understanding that  the 
adopted children receive only a nominal compensation for this service. (By 
being adopted by  someone else, one does not forfeit the legal right of being 
the statutory heir to one’s biological parents.) This loophole was widely rec- 
ognized and exploited by  wealthy families. Table 10.8 reveals a strong corre- 




of yen)  01  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  llf 
Number  of Statutory Heirs in Relation to Property Values, 1988 
Number of  Statutory Heirs 
0-30 
30 < 40 
40 < 50 
50 < 100 
100 <  200 
200 C 300 
300 < 500 
500 c 
39  257 
10  597 
11  604 
12  913 
14  545 
11  123 
19  94 
2  67 
158 
798  495  264 
1,124  904  586  710  70  57 
4,630  4,472  3,233  3,170  603  279  121  70  27  112 
2,780  3,644  3,305  2,563  864  467  244  113  61  141 
726  1,105  1,143  842  347  226  136  54  33  71 
435  779  854  582  327  155  113  60  32  49 
305  568  799  559  335  261  136  83  42  85 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, Tar Bureau Srarisrics Annual (various issues). 
Nore: The median number of  statutory heirs for each bequeathed taxable income bracket was 1 for 0-30 
(million yen); 2 for 30-40;  3 for 40-50;  3 for 50-100,4  for each of  100-200,  200-300,  300-500,  and 
over 500. 
To  close this loophole, the 1988 revision included a cap on the number of 
adopted children counted as statutory heirs. The effective date for this change 
was not until December 31, 1988, unlike most other changes, which became 
effective on January 1, 1988. Hence, we have to wait one more year to see the 
difference in this kind of  table. We  conjecture that when  we  compute table 
10.8 for 1989, the number of statutory heirs among the wealthy will be signif- 
icantly reduced. That would prove that adopted children, real or token, have 
been significantly lowering the tax liability of wealthy families. 
10.4.2  Land Assessment 
All bequeathed assets, securities, and real estate are, in principle, valued at 
their fair market value. In practice, two deviations from this principle exist. 
Real estate, such as residential land, and land and structures for family busi- 
ness, are assessed at less than their market value. This results partly because 
assessments for inheritance purpose are underestimated and partly because 
there is a special provision for small property. 
The first factor results from administrative practice. Land, which is a major 
portion of real property in Japan, is assessed for inheritance tax according to 
a valuation map (known as Rosen Ka) in the Tax Bureau’s office. This is dif- 
ferent from the land price survey (known as Koji Kakaku) done by the Land 
Agency of the Japanese government, or the land valuation for real estate taxes 
(imposed by municipal governments). Each of these three government assess- 
ments (Koji Kakaku, Rosen Ka, and real estate tax assessment) is below the 
market value of property. 
Experts widely follow a rule of  thumb. The Koji Kakaku, polled once a 
year, is approximately 70 to 80 percent of  the market value. The Rosen Ka, 
for bequest evaluation, is approximately 50 to 70 percent of the Koji Kakaku. 
Homma and  Atoda (1989,  134-35)  investigated the gap between the Koji 251  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Kakaku and Rosen Ka at the places of highest Rosen Ka in the capital cities 
of prefectures. They found that in 1988 the gap ranged from 33.5 percent in 
Kyoto to 94.1 percent in Kofu, with an average of 56.4 percent. Hence, the 
ratio of Rosen Ka, the assessment of land for bequest, to the market value is 
anywhere between 25 and 80 percent,  but more likely around 40 to 50 per- 
cent. 
The second factor for underassessment  is a provision  for small sites for 
residences such as rental housing or for business. The assessment for the 200 
square meters of residential property is reduced by 50 percent and for business 
sites by 60 percent.  If the property is partly residential  and partly business, 
the business portion is reduced by 60 percent,  and the residential  portion is 
reduced by 40 percent, providing that the average rate is above 50 percent. 
In sum, a bequest carried in the form of real estate is subject to less inheri- 
tance  tax  than  that  carried  in  the  form  of  securities.  Moreover,  since the 
amount of debt is deductible in full, an effective way to reduce inheritance tax 
is to borrow a large sum of money to purchase real property, preferably shortly 
before death, so that the property is still highly levered at the time of interge- 
nerational transfer. 
To  curtail such tax planning,  the  1988 tax reform mandated that any real 
estate (land and structures, excluding the decedent’s personal residence) pur- 
chased within three years of the date of death is assessed at its purchase price. 
(This is evidence that the tax authority admits that assessed values are in prac- 
tice  less than  the  market  value.)  This rule  still permits  a tax  advantage  in 
periods of high land inflation. 
We expect that this favorable assessment induces the elderly with a bequest 
motive to shift their portfolio into real estate. The evidence suggests that is 
the case.  First,  the share of land in tax-filing bequeathed property  value is 
higher than the share of land in outstanding property value of households. In 
1988, the former was 69 percent, while the latter was 53 percent. Second, the 
share of land in bequest property value is higher in Japan than in the United 
States. In Japan about 65 percent of bequests are in the form of land, while in 
the United  States, only about 20  percent  are in land.  Even under the most 
generous interpretation,  which would accept the SIPP data as the most accu- 
rate and count none of the farm and business property as real estate, and at the 
same time attribute no debt to the real estate claimed on the estate tax returns, 
the percentage of real estate in decedent’s estates is barely 0.4  percent of U.S. 
wealth represented by real estate. This figure is less than half of the compa- 
rable figure for Japan. This may reflect the substantial benefit in Japan to the 
decedent holding his or her wealth in real estate at the time of death. 
However, some cautious notes to the above conclusion are due. There may 
be some reasons that the land component in bequests may become larger, even 
in the absence of underassessment for bequest purposes. First, unrealized cap- 
ital gains on the land of the elderly may avoid capital gains tax if bequeathed 
instead of sold. Second, one might argue that the relatively high land compo- 
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but may result from unexpected capital gains on land and premature death. 
Put differently, if  precautionary saving in imputed housing services is preva- 
lent, unexpected land price increases, as in Japan, create a large proportion of 
land value in bequests. In fact, in Japan the land proportion has increased at 
times of land price increases. 
Both arguments stress that land prices have increased faster in Japan than 
the United States. The ratio of  land to total bequest has been  consistently 
higher in Japan than in the United States, by a large margin. Moreover, if  the 
(intended) bequest motive is weak,  financial borrowing (second mortgage) 
among the elderly against unrealized capital gains should increase as unex- 
pected land price inflation takes place. Existing data do not reveal commen- 
surate increases in second mortgages. 
10.5  Estimating Bequeathed Assets in Outstanding Assets in Japan 
10.5.1  Simulation 
In this section, we make an attempt to estimate how much assets are trans- 
ferred from one generation to another. This is a relevant question in the con- 
troversy of  Modigliani (1988) and  Kotlikoff  (1988). If  intergenerationally 
transferred assets constitute only a minor share of  outstanding assets, then 
asset accumulation can be regarded mostly as a life-cycle phenomenon. How- 
ever, if  intergenerational transfers are large compared to outstanding assets, 
this suggests intended and unintended bequests play an important role in asset 
accumulation, and life-cycle saving theory has to be revised as such. 
Our method of  inference is to measure the amount of bequest from deaths 
as a proportion of the outstanding household assets, and then multiply by  25 
to obtain the generational transfer. (For other methods of inference, see Mo- 
digliani 1988.) 
In estimating intergenerational transfers from bequest tax data, there are 
several stumbling blocks on the way from bequest taxation data to bequeathed 
assets. We  identify several key problems below and make explicit assump- 
tions  to  surmount them.  When  possible,  the  reasonable lower and  upper 
bound will be provided. When we have to make judgmental assumptions, we 
try to estimate the lower bound of intergenerational transfers. 
First,  we  concentrate on  intergenerational transfers upon  the  deaths of 
couples, ignoring inter vivos transfers altogether. As  mentioned in  section 
10.2, one may transfer a significant amount to heirs as gifts without taxes if 
transfers were  planned  for  many  years.  In  this  sense, our estimates con- 
structed solely from bequest data constitute the lower bound of  intergenera- 
tional transfers. 
Second, bequest taxation covers only those we call “taxable deaths.” We 
have to assume how much wealth is transferred by those who are not required 
to file the bequest  tax  form, that  is, nontaxable deaths. This is a problem 
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death can be assumed to leave zero wealth, and as a reasonable upper bound, 
nontaxable death may be assumed to leave a full deductible amount (that is 
the basic deductible amount, 40  + (3  X  the number of statutory heirs) mil- 
lion yen in Japan and $600,000 (the unified credit) in the United States. As a 
reasonable estimate,  we infer the average assets of nontaxable  deaths from 
other sources. 
Third, double counting is possible in taxable deaths. When a wealthy hus- 
band dies first, he bequeaths a portion to children and a portion to his widow. 
This shows up in the taxable death data. Some years later, the widow dies with 
a bequest to children that is still sufficiently large to be caught in bequest tax. 
Age and sex of decedents in the Japanese bequest taxation are not available, 
so that we may not know how extensive this problem is. We simply assume 
for the Japanese data that the double counting problem is minor and that tax- 
able deaths are all male and 50 years or older. This is the only assumption that 
might bias our estimate of intergenerational transfers upward. The wealthiest 
persons certainly plan to avoid double taxation, in addition to natural deple- 
tion of assets by the widow. The widow typically receives only a portion of 
the husband’s bequest, and she would have many years to spend this bequest 
and make inter vivos transfers to children. By the time of her death, we as- 
sume that the wealthiest widows’ assets are substantially reduced so that they 
would not be taxable. This leads to another stage of  assumption, about how 
much of the bequest, taxable and nontaxable, to a spouse ultimately is handed 
down to children. 
Fourth, we will reduce the amount of bequest in the calculation of interge- 
nerational  transfers,  as an allowance for the widow who consumes the be- 
queathed assets.  In Japan,  the amount bequeathed to the widow  is inferred 
from the amount of tax credit for a spouse. Then we calculate the upper and 
lower bounds for intergenerational transfers. At the lower bound, the wife is 
assumed to consume all assets bequeathed to her.  (In this case, the double 
counting problem above disappears automatically.) At the upper bound,  the 
widow is assumed to live off  her own assets and returns from her husband’s 
bequest and to bequeath eventually the principal components of her husband’s 
bequeathed assets to children.  (Under this assumption,  the double counting 
problem above would additionally bias the estimate upward.) 
In order to correct for taxable versus nontaxable deaths, we examine the 
proportion of taxable deaths in table  10.9. Among all deaths, taxable deaths 
were only 2 percent in 1975 but rose to about 8 percent in 1987. During those 
thirteen years,  inflation  and wealth  accumulation over a half generation  in- 
creased the nominal value of bequeathed property, while virtually all tax de- 
ductions, credits, and brackets were kept unchanged.2 
2. The reduction from 1987 to 1988 is due to the tax reform of 1988. The 1988 tax reform was 
advertised as a revenue-neutral package consisting of  an introduction of a consumption tax and a 
reduction in income, excise, and inheritance taxes. However, a reduction in taxable deaths pushed 
back the clock by only two years, out of twelve years of  bracket creep. 254  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
Table 10.9  Death, Taxable Death, and Land and Total Bequest per Taxable Decedent, 
Japan 
Deaths  Per Taxable Death 
All Ages,  50+  Years,  TAXDTHR  TAXDSOMR  Land  Total 
Both Sexes  Males  Taxable  (%)  (%)  (billions of yen)  (billions of yen) 

































































4.12  9.72 
4.63  10.87 
Tax Reform 
2.08  4.84 
2.26  5.21 
2.58  5.91 
2.90  6.57 
3.28  7.36 
3.70  8.19 
4.38  9.64 
5.04  11.0 
5.34  11.5 
5.81  12.4 
6.39  13.6 
6.90  14.6 
7.85  16.5 
Tax Reform 
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Note: Bequest tax statistics do not contain information on the age and sex of decendent.TAXDTHR = 
ratio of  taxable deaths to all deaths; TAXDSOMR  = ratio of taxable deaths to deaths of males age fifty 
and over. 
Sources: Ministry of  Health and Welfare,  Viral Statistics Japan (various issues); Ministry of  Finance, 
Tax Bureau, Tax Bureau Statistics (various issues). 
As a proxy for a death of a representative  member of  a “generation,” the 
number of deaths among the male cohort of 50 years or older is shown in table 
10.9 (second column). The ratio of  taxable deaths to deaths in this cohort of 
older males was 5 percent in 1975 and 16.5 percent in 1987, assuming that all 
taxable deaths are part of generational deaths. 
The last two columns of table 10.9 show land and total wealth per taxable 
death (in billions of  yen). The jump in these two values from  1988 to  1989 
reflects both the truncation of the sample due to the tax reform and high land 
price inflation. 
Since nontaxable deaths did not get taxed, their bequeathed property value 
was less than  the  amount of  the basic  deduction plus  other deductions and 
values toward other credits, barring illegal transfers. Here we assume that a 
nontaxable decedent bequeaths property that equals ratio K of the basic deduc- 
tion for three heirs (wife and two ~hildren).~  In the simulation, we allow K to 
3.  With three heirs, the basic exemption of  Y(20 + 4  X  3) million from 1975 to 1987 and 
the current exemption of  Y(40 + 8  x  3) million are completely tax free. In a sense, we assume 255  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
vary from 0 to 1. Approximately half of the asset value of bequeathed property 
was  held in the form of  land. In  section 10.5.2 we  discuss how  to guess a 
reasonable value for K. 
We  require a series of assumptions to undertake our simulations. First, lia- 
bilities, funeral expenses, and bequest taxes (after tax credit) are deducted in 
the calculation of  intergenerational transfers of  taxable decedents. The ratio 
of these liabilities, etc., to the bequeathed gross amount is assumed to be the 
same for nontaxable deaths, too. 
Second, an assumption is made with  regard to how  the transfers to the 
widow(er) will be dissaved before the widow(er)’s death. Recall that bequests 
to a spouse receive a special tax credit in Japan (unlike in the United States 
where unlimited deduction is possible). Thus, “intra”-generational transfers 
are estimated from the ratio of claimed spouse tax credit to the total bequest 
tax  (before tax  credit).  Then,  it  is assumed that a constant fraction, MM, 
(benchmark is MA4  = 0.5) of  the transfers to the spouse is later bequeathed 
to children, upon the widow(er)’s death. The transfer is assumed to be free 
from the inheritance tax, because only a portion of the original property was 
given to the spouse, and then a portion is dissaved by  the spouse. As varia- 
tions, we prepare two tables with MM  = 0.0 and 1 .O The former implies that 
a wife consumes all of the assets she received upon her husband’s death so 
that she would bequeath no assets to her children, and the latter that a wife 
consumes none of the assets, presumably living off her own life-cycle savings 
(including any inter vivos transfers from her husband). 
Third, suppose that one generation consists of  twenty-five years. Hence, 
we take the average of the bequest transfers over twelve years and blow it up 
by  25. In the steady state, this procedure amounts to the following assump- 
tion. At one point in time, we would classify wealth in two categories, be- 
quest wealth that is transferred from the ancestor and will be handed down to 
heirs, and  life-cycle wealth that  is saved when young but will be dissaved 
when old. We  consider that the steady state is defined by a constant ratio of 
bequest  wealth  to  total  wealth.  Conceptually,  the  returns  of  the  bequest 
wealth, with the return being the same as on other types of assets, are assumed 
to be compounding and included in bequest wealth. Otherwise the conditions 
of the steady state would be violated. 
Fourth, the assessment of land has to be adjusted. In Japan, land for bequest 
is underassessed, as argued in section 10.4.2. Accordingly, the value of land 
has to be inflated from that reported in the taxation data. The ratio of  Rosen 
Ka (assessment for bequest tax) to Koji Kakaku (the monitoring price that is 
believed to be used in National Accounts, Stock Division survey) is defined 
as U.  The lower bounds estimate for intergenerational transfer is obtained 
when  U  =  1. However, a more realistic number is 0.56 (recall discussion of 
two parents are on average survived by two children, but at the time of the husband’s death, the 
wife is still alive. Therefore, a male decedent of 50 years or older is assumed to be survived by 
two children and and wife in the taxation statistics. 256  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
the estimates by  Homma and Atoda  1989 in section  10.4.2). If the typical 
residential real estate is less than 200 square meters, however, an assessment 
will further be reduced by 50 percent (so that  U  = 0.28). Of course,  some 
families own a second house or manage rental housing. The correction should 
not be 50 percent from 0.56. On the other hand, agricultural land has much 
more favorable treatment. Allowing for some large properties, it may be plau- 
sible to consider U somewhere between 0.26 and 0.56. Hence, for the simu- 
lation, we select U  = 0.34, 0.56, 0.78, and  1.0. We  believe the truth is a 
value of U somewhere between 0.34  and 0.56. 
The last and most difficult stumbling block is to guess how much an average 
nontaxable decedent bequeaths to heirs, and how the assets are divided among 
land and other assets. We will make our best effort on this front in the section 
10.5.2. 
10.5.2  Estimation of Transfers from Nontaxable Decedents 
The next important step is to guess the amount of transfers by the nontax- 
able decedents, and narrow the upper and lower bounds on parameter K.  The 
following calculation is done for calendar year 1988. 
For the average assets of households, we use a table from the Family Saving 
Survey, which lists the average “savings” (financial assets only) and liabilities 
of households classified by age brackets (see columns 5 and 6 of table 10.10). 
However, we have to make several adjustments. First, the statistics show only 
those elderly who remain as household heads.  The elderly person who lives 
with  his or her children  (that is, forming a “merged” family) is typically a 
dependent instead of a household head.  (Usually, the household head is de- 
fined in various statistics as the person who earns the most in the family lo- 
cated at the same address.) If the household heads and the merged have differ- 
ent asset characteristics,  we have  to adjust  for the difference.  Second, the 
survey does not have information on the sex of  household heads.  Third, the 
survey has only financial ~aving.~  However, the survey does contain a “home 
ownership ratio,” that is the ratio of “owner-occupied‘’ household heads to all 
household heads. 
In order to correct for the first point, from the Basic Life Survey (Kokumin 
Seikatsu Kiso Chosa), statistics on the household status of the elderly (sixty 
years and over) can be estimated. This survey classifies the elderly into eight 
different  categories  with  respect  to their  relationship  to  household  heads.5 
4.  Takayama (1991) estimated the value of landholdings by age of household heads from indi- 
vidual responses to the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure. In 1987 the median 
of land values held by  those aged 60-64,  65-69,  70-74,  and 75 and over is  Y22, Y24, Y22, 
and  Y24 million, respectively. The mean of land values for the same age groups is  Y44, Y44, 
Y38, and  Y44 million. Dekle (1990) used a different survey and estimated landholdings of  the 
typical household head of age 60-64,  65-69,  and 70-74  to be Y27, Y30,  and Y 34 million. 
5. The eight categories are as follows: (1) single household (the elderly becomes household 
head); (2) household with the elderly couple only (the elderly becomes household head); (3) living 
with children but maintaining a household head status; (4) living with children, and the elderly is Table 10.10  Average Net Assets of Japanese Households, 1988 
Households  Non-household-head 
(in thousands)  Males (in thousands)  Financial  Financial  Net Assets 
Assets  Liability  Male Household  Net Assets 
Male  Female  BothSexes  Weights  (thousands of yen)  (thousands of yen)  Head  of Males  Male Deaths 
Age  (1)  (2)  (3=1+2)  (Nl)  (hp=l/(l+Nl))  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8=7Xhp)  (9) 
50-54  4,200  250  4,450  0  1  .OO  0.1248  13,108  3,808  9,568  9,568  22,209 
55-59  3,600  200  3,800  0  1  .OO  0.1029  15,749  3,204  12,884  12,884  32,928 
60-64  2,458  354  2,812  470  0.839  0.0893  19,333  1,625  18,897  15,854  38,238 
65-up  4,285  1,220  5,505  1,253  0.773  0.1139  17,412  1,307  18,111  14,000  285,044 
Average of (8) weighted by (9) 13,826 
Notes: Column 1: For age group 60-64  and 65-up,  one-man households, male-headed households of couples, plus (0.8 times those who are classified as household 
heads of the elderly who live with child[renJ). The last term does not have a breakdown to male and female, so that it was multiplied by 0.8 to allow for female 
household heads living with child(ren). The multiplier 0.8 is a guess (Basic Life Survey 1988). For age groups 50-54,  and 55-59,  inferred from column 4. This 
is a guess. 
Column 2: For age groups 60-64  and 65-up,  one-woman households. For age groups 50-54  and 55-59,  inferred from 4. This is a guess. 
Column N1: Male population for that age bracket minus column  1. 
Column hp: ratio of male household heads to total males. 
Column 4: Estimated weights of household number for that age bracket used in the Family Savings Survey (1988). 
Columns 5 and 6: Family Savings Survey (1988). 
Column 7: First,  subtract  liabilities form assets.  Then assume that a household headed by  female has a net asset equal to  half  of  a male-headed household. 
(7) = ((5 -  (6)) x (3)/((1) +  (2)/2). 
Column 8: Correct for those who are not household heads. Assume those who are not a household head own 0 assets. These are typically merged in children’s 
household. 
Column 9: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Viral Srarisfics  Japan. 
Average net financial assets 
Taxable decedent’s average net financial assets 
(securities + cash + miscellaneous -  liabilities, tables 10.4 and 10.5)/50,625 
Weight (TAXDSOMR in table 10.9) 
Nontaxable decedent’s average financial assets 
Weight (1 -  TkDSOMR) 
Nontaxable decedent’s average financial assets plus land (assessed at Rosen Ka) 
K=  (N/M)/64,000,OOO  = 
N = (A)-(BXw)/(l-w)= 
A  = Y13,826,OOO 
B  = Y  41,760,000 
w = 0.133 
N 
0.867 
Y 9,54  1  ,OOO 
NIM 
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From the survey, we may infer the numbers of the male household heads and 
male non-household  heads. The non-household-head  elderly are assumed to 
hold zero assets (an underestimate bias); and the female household heads are 
assumed to hold half the assets of the male. With these assumptions, the av- 
erage household head assets and liabilities statistics in the Family Saving Sur- 
vey  are corrected to become the average male elderly assets and liabilities, 
regardless of household head status. This is shown in column 8 of table 10.10. 
In order to be consistent  with the bequest tax statistics, where no age infor- 
mation is  available, column 8 is aggregated over age brackets with weights 
taken from the frequency of death by  age bracket. Finally, we obtain the in- 
ferred average net asset for an average dying male person,  % 13,826,000. 
Suppose that the Family Saving Survey samples both the wealthy and the 
poor correctly.  (It may be that the highest income bracket is undersampled. 
This would make our estimate for nontaxable decedents’ assets biased down- 
ward.) We  then calculate the average financial holdings of  taxable decedents 
from table 10.5 to be Y41,760,000. 
Recall that the fraction of taxable deaths per generation was 0.133 (table 
10.9). In order to arrive at Y  13,826,000 as an average of taxable and nontax- 
able deaths, the  nontaxable  death  average financial  asset  is  inferred  to be 
Y9,541,000. 
The last adjustment we have to make is to estimate the landholding of  non- 
taxable decedents. The financial share in a nontaxable decedent’s portfolio is 
denoted  by  M. Here,  we  assume  a  ratio  similar  to  the  taxable  decedent, 
M = 0.35. (The case for M  = 0.5 is shown in table 10.12.) Since the home 
owner ratio does not seem to decline with age according to the Family Saving 
Survey, the assumption  is not  unreasonable.  Then K, the average net asset 
holding of nontaxable decedents, is calculated as 0.426. 
10.5.3  Simulation 
Since the parameter of land underassessment and that of nontaxable death 
may not be absolutely reliable, we conducted simulations to ascertain the ro- 
bustness of the results. 
Results of simulation are shown in tables  10.11 and  10.12. In the bench- 
mark case, table 10.1  1, the widow(er) is assumed to dissave 50 percent of the 
a spouse of the household head (typically, the female elderly, where the male elderly is a house- 
hold head); (5)  living with children, and a child is a household head; (6)  living with children, and 
the elderly is a parent of the spouse of the household head; (7) living with children with other 
kinds of relationships; and (8) other living arrangements. For categories  1, 2, and 8, male and 
female statistics are shown separately. Only the sum of 3 through 7 can be decomposed into males 
and females. The male household heads are calculated as the sum of  1, 2, and 80 percent of 3. 
The 80 percent multiplier in the last term is necessary because for 3, male and female decompo- 
sition is not available, and some household heads living with children are females. If taken as 100 
percent of 3, the highest age bracket would have a higher household head ratio than the second 
highest age bracket. Consequently, we made the 80 percent adjustment. 259  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10.11  Simulation of  the Ratio of Bequest Wealth to Total Wealth, Japan 
~ 
u=0.34  u=0.56  u=0.78  u= 1.0 
K  Land  Asset  Land  Asset  Land  Asset  Land  Asset 
0.0  29.8  17.9  18.1  11.5  13.0  8.7  10.1  7.1 
0.1  38.8  23.6  23.6  15.3  16.9  11.7  13.2  9.7 
0.2  47.9  29.4  29.0  19.1  20.8  14.7  16.2  12.2 
0.3  56.9  35.1  34.5  23.0  24.8  17.7  19.3  14.7 
0.4  65.9  40.9  40.0  26.8  28.7  20.7  22.4  17.3 
0.426  68.3  42.3  41.4  27.8  29.7  21.5  23.2  17.9 
0.5  74.9  46.6  45.5  30.7  32.6  23.7  25.4  19.8 
0.6  84.0  52.4  51.0  34.5  36.6  26.7  28.5  22.4 
0.7  93.0  58.1  56.5  38.3  40.5  29.7  31.6  24.9 
0.8  102.0  63.9  61.9  42.2  44.5  32.7  34.7  27.4 
0.9  111.1  69.6  67.4  46.0  48.4  35.7  37.7  30.0 
1  .o  120.1  75.3  72.9  49.9  52.3  38.7  40.8  32.5 
Notes: This simulation assumes M = 0.35, MM  = 0.5, and K = 0.426 = (9,54I/M)/64,000. 
M =  (portfolio parameter of nontaxable decedent) the ratio of financial assets to total net assets 
among the nontaxable decedent’s portfolio. 
MM =  (dissaving of widow parameter) the ratio of the widow’s bequest to children to husband’s 
bequest to the wife. 
K=  (nontaxable death wealth parameter) the ratio of assets (financial and land) to the basic de- 
duction amount for nontaxable death. If  an estimate of average net “financial” asset for nontax- 
able death of  Y  9,541 million in  1988 is adopted, and if M=0.35, then K is equal to 0.426. 
U = (underassessment of  land) the ratio of  land value for bequest to land value of  National 
Accounts. 
property inherited from the spouse. The widow(er) is assumed to dissave 0 
percent in table 10.12A and 100 percent in table 10.12B. 
In the benchmark case, suppose that the land underassessment ratio is 0.56 
and that nontaxable deaths on average leave 0.426 of  the basic deduction. 
Then 41 percent of land and 28 percent of net household assets are obtained 
by bequest. If  the land underassessment ratio is 0.34, then 68 percent of land 
and 42 percent of net household assets are obtained by bequest. 
10.6  Estimating Bequeathed Assets in Outstanding Assets in the 
United States 
In this section, we attempt to make an estimate, comparable to those esti- 
mates for Japan, of  the proportion of  national wealth transferred from one 
generation to the next in the United States. Table 10.13 presents data for the 
United  States which are roughly comparable to the data of  table  10.10 for 
Japan. Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve’s definition of household includes 
the assets and liabilities of personal trusts and nonprofit organizations. While 
it is certainly appropriate to include personal trusts in an analysis of bequest 
and gift behavior, the inclusion of nonprofit organizations may or may not be 260  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
Table 10.12  Simulations, Japan 
u  =  0.34  u =  0.56  u =  0.78  u=I.OO 
















A.  M  = 0.35, MM = 0.00, K  = 0.426 = (9,54I/M)/64,000 
45.8  29.2  27.8  19.4  20.0  15.2  15.6 
53.7  34.2  32.6  22.8  23.4  17.8  18.2 
55.8  35.5  33.9  23.6  24.3  18.5  18.9 
61.6  39.2  37.4  26.1  26.8  20.4  20.9 
69.6  44.2  42.2  29.5  30.3  23.0  23.6 
E.  M  = 0.35, MM = 1.0, K  = 0.426 = (9,54I/M)/64,000 
69.1  41.5  41.9  26.7  30.1  20.3  23.5 
79.3  47.9  48.1  31.0  34.5  23.7  26.9 
81.9  49.6  49.7  32.2  35.7  24.6  27.8 
89.4  54.4  54.3  35.4  39.0  27.1  30.4 
99.6  60.9  60.5  39.7  43.4  30.4  33.8 
C.  M  = 0.5, MM = 0.5, K  = 0.298 = (9,54I/M)/64,000 
50.5  32.8  30.6  22.0  22.0  17.3  17.1 
50.6  32.9  30.7  22.1  22.0  17.4  17.2 
57.6  37.9  34.9  25.6  25.1  20.3  19.5 
64.5  42.9  39.2  29.2  28.1  23.2  21.9 
















Table 10.13  Household Assets and Liabilities at Year End 1976-89, United States 
(in billions of dollars) 

























































Source; U.S. Board of  Governors  of  the Federal  Reserve  System,  Flow of  Funds Accounts 
(  1990). 
Note: Includes holdings and liabilities of  households,  personal trusts,  and nonprofit organiza- 
tions.  However, the holdings of  land, residential structures,  and  plant and  equipment by  tax- 
exempt organizations are deleted from the compilation of assets, while liabilities of  tax-exempt 
debt are deleted from the compilation of liabilities. 261  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10.14  Composition of Bequeathed Assets, United States (in millions of  dollars) 
Funeral and 
Year  Real Estate  Assets’  Assetsb  Expense  Liabilities  Taxesc  Taxes  Bequestd 
Financial  Other  Administrative  State  Federal  Net 
1976  12,920.9  30,508.1  4,772.6  2,022.1  2,649.0  552.3  4,979.1  37,999.1 
1981  10,974.3  26.722.1  7,263.5  1,654.0  2,600.7  919.7  6,226.0  33,559.1 
1984  13,948.4  35,823.1  9,796.3  1,885.4  3,608.4  1,077.6  5,035.4  47,961.0 
1987  13,564.8  43,401.1  13,659.5  1,898.1  3,238.2  1,567.5  6,299.2  57,662.4 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division. 
‘Includes value of noncorporate businesses. 
bSum of household goods and lifetime transfers 
Value of  state death tax credit, hence an underestimate of  all state taxes. 
dCalculation nets all expenses, liabilities, and taxes against total assets. 
appropriate. To  the extent the holdings of  nonprofit organizations represent 
pension fund assets that are held on behalf of  individuals, the net holdings 
should be included. To the extent the holdings of nonprofit organizations are 
endowments of universities or other charitable organizations, the net holdings 
should be excluded. 
The inclusion of trusts and nonprofit organizations has a large effect. For 
example, in 1984 the Federal Reserve calculated the holdings of financial as- 
sets of households at $8.8 trillion and the holdings of financial assets of indi- 
viduals at $6.9 trillion. The liabilities of households were $2.1 trillion and the 
liabilities of individuals were $3.2 trillion.6 Consequently, the net financial 
assets of households were $6.7 trillion and the net financial assets of individ- 
uals were $3.7 trillion. To  partially correct for this we  have netted from the 
asset data the value of residential structures, plant and equipment, and land 
held by tax-exempt organizations. We  also have netted from the liability data 
the value of  tax-exempt debt, which presumably can only be issued by tax- 
exempt organizations. However, we are unable to make any consistent correc- 
tions for holdings of financial assets by tax-exempt organizations. We observe 
that the estimated net worth of households reported in table 10.13 exceeds the 
estimates of the PSID and SIPP studies for 1984 cited in section 10.3. 
Table  10.14 provides a composition of  bequeathed  assets for the  years 
1976, 1981, 1984, and 1987 for taxpayers who filed estate tax returns in 1977, 
1982, 1985, and 1988. The data do not precisely correspond to bequests for 
each year because some estate tax returns filed in any particular year are not 
returns for a death in the year immediately preceding filing. We calculated the 
net bequest (last column on the right) by  subtracting all liabilities, expenses, 
6. Federal Reserve Boards of Governors, “Financial Assets and Liabilities Year-End,  1964- 
87,” September 1988. In addition to the exclusion of trusts and nonprofit organizations,  the data 
for individuals include the assets and liabilities  of nonfarm noncorporate businesses and corporate 
farms. The Federal Reserve does not separately report the assets and liabilities of nonprofit orga- 
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and taxes against the value of financial assets in the estate. As such it is com- 
parable to table 10.13. Unlike the comparable data in table 10.10 for Japan, 
these data are defined by those estates that filed returns, regardless of whether 
there ultimately was a tax liability. 
Table  10.15 reports taxable  estate tax  returns  as a percentage  of  annual 
deaths. Generally, for each taxable return filed, a nontaxable return is filed. 
Table  10.15 shows that the percentage  of  taxable deaths rose from  1935 to 
1977, since which time it has declined. As discussed above, in the absence of 
changes in the estate tax, inflation and the growth in per capita wealth causes 
more decedents’ estates to incur an estate tax liability. This was the case until 
1977. The Tax Reform Act of  1976 increased the estate tax exclusion from 
$30,000 to $60,000.  The Economic Recovery  Tax  Act  of  1981 further  in- 
creased the annual exclusion to $600,000.7 In addition, as discussed in appen- 
dix B, the 1981 act created an unlimited marital reduction,  which further re- 
duces the number of  estates subject  to tax.  The increase  in the  estate tax 
exclusion and the marital deduction removed a substantial number of estates 
from federal estate taxation, as table 10.15 documents. Even when the marital 
deduction results in no tax liability, however, a return must be filed. To arrive 
at a comparable figure for the United States for intergenerational deaths, we 
use the  1986 ratio  of  deaths of  males  aged  55 or older to total deaths, 42 
percent. 
In table 10.16 we make a lower bound estimate of  the ratio of transferred 
assets to outstanding assets. As discussed in section 10.2, U.S. law and prac- 
tice generally value all assets at market value.  In addition, unlike Japan, the 
U.S.  data reveal no preference  for real estate or other specific assets as a tax 
planning device.* To  arrive at an estimate of  generational bequests we divide 
7. The 1976 increase in the exclusion was phased in over 1977 to 1980, and the 1981 increase 
was phased in annually from 1982 through 1987. 
8.  Patric Hendershott has raised to us the question of  whether “flower bonds” constitute a 
significant preference that might alter the composition of  the portfolios of American decedents. 
Prior to March 3, 1971, the Treasury could issue bonds that could be redeemed at par in payment 
of an estate or gift tax liability, if the taxpayer had purchased such bonds prior to his or her death. 
The Treasury issued limited series of  such bonds, which became known as flower bonds. When 
issued in the 1950s and early 1960s. flower bonds carried competitive coupon rates. Subsequent 
increases in the rate of inflation and interest rates have caused the outstanding bonds to trade at 
substantial discounts to par. Consequently, purchase of the bonds at discount for redemption at par 
to pay estate taxes may be quite profitable, even though the value of the bonds must be carried at 
par for purposes of  determining the gross estate. 
Since 1980 only nine series of these bonds have been outstanding (all issued prior to 1964). At 
present, only five series of flower bonds have yet to reach maturity. In 1988, approximately 1  ,000 
estates redeemed approximately $200 million worth of  flower bonds at par to pay the estate tax. 
More than 18,000 taxable estates were taxable that year. Moreover, the value of bonds redeemed 
at par represented approximately 3 percent of total estate tax liability, only 11 percent of the value 
of all federal bonds in filers’ estates, less than 3 percent of the value of all bonds in filers’ estates, 
and approximately 0.5 percent of the value of the gross estate of those filers who incurred a tax 
liability. In earlier years flower bonds were more prominent. In 1982 approximately 10 percent of 
taxable returns redeemed flower bonds worth approximately 10 percent of their tax estate of their 
tax liability, but less than 2 percent of value of the gross estate of those filers who incurred a tax 
liability. However, the composition of estates looks quite similar in 1982 and 1988 (see appendix 263  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10.15  Number of Taxable Estate Tax Returns Filed as a Percentage of Adult 
Deaths, Selected Years 1935-88,  United States 
Taxable Estate Tax  Return 
Fileda 
Percentage 




































































1  .oo 
0.87 
Sources: Pechman (1987); Internal Revenue Service, Statistics  of Income Division; U.S. National 
Center for Health Statistics. 
'Estate returns need not be filed in the year of  the decedent's death. 
bNot strictly comparable with pre-1966 data. For 1966 and later years, the estate tax after credits 
was the basis for determining taxable returns. For prior years, the basis was the estate tax before 
credits. 
cAlthough the filing requirement was  for gross estates in excess of  $225,000 for  1982 deaths, 
$275,000 for 1983 deaths, and $325,000 for 1984 deaths, the data are limited to gross estates of 
$300,000 or more. The filing requirement increased to $400,000 for 1985 deaths, $500,000 for 
1986 deaths, and $600,000 for deaths in 1987 and thereafter. 
Table 10.16  Bequeathed Assets as a Percentage of Net Household Assets, United 
States 
Net  Net Total  Generational Bequest Ratio 
Bequests  Assets  Bequest Ratio 
Year  (millions of $)  (billions of  $)  (a)  MM=1  MM=0.5  MM=O 
1976  37,999.1  5,183.4  0.733  18.33  14.66  11.00 
1981  33,559.5  9,382.2  0.358  8.94  7.15  5.36 
1984  47,961.0  11,326.1  0.423  10.58  8.46  6.35 
1981  57,622.4  14,260.4  0.404  10.10  8.08  6.06 
B). Consequently, we  do not believe that the existence of  flower bonds has significantly altered 
the composition of the portfolios of American decedents. 264  Thomas A. Barthoid and Takatoshi Ito 
the net bequest (as defined in table 10.14) by the household sector’s net worth 
(as reported in table  10.13). This produces the bequest ratio in table 10.16. 
As above, we  multiply the bequest ration by  25 to convert the bequeathed 
stock of assets into a flow. 
Lastly we make an adjustment to the generational bequest ratio to account 
for the marital deduction permitted under the U.S. transfer taxes. The U.S. 
bequest data are for those who file, not for taxable returns. A husband could 
die and his estate would file a return, even if  under the marital deduction all 
his wealth was bequeathed to his wife. If the wife died the next year, her estate 
would file a return, which could contain nearly the identical assets. When this 
occurs, assets bequeathed to the surviving spouse would be counted twice in 
our analysis. Consequently, we compute an  “adjusted generational bequest 
ratio .” 
In practice, the data reveal that decedents do not leave their entire estate to 
their surviving spouse. The 1977 estate tax data report approximately 20 per- 
cent of the gross estate claimed the marital deduction. However, prior to 1982 
not all assets bequeathed to a surviving spouse qualified for the marital deduc- 
tion. The experience from 1985 and 1988 when  an unlimited marital deduc- 
tion was in effect reveals that approximately one-third of  the gross estate is 
bequeathed to the surviving spouse. For 1988 returns, this represents approx- 
imately 40 percent of the net after-tax bequest. To be conservative, we assume 
each estate has a surviving spouse to which 40 percent of the net bequest is 
made. We present three possible scenarios: (1) the surviving spouse consumes 
none of the bequeathed assets and bequeaths the assets to the next generation 
upon death (MM = 0); (2) the surviving spouse consumes one-half of  be- 
queathed assets and bequeaths the remaining assets upon death (MM = 0.5); 
and (3) the surviving spouse consumes all of  the assets, passing on none to 
the next generation (M = 1  .O). 
This computation suggests that, at a minimum, 5.4 percent of U.S. house- 
hold wealth in  the  1980s is intergenerational bequeathed wealth. The result 
for 1976 substantially exceeds that of the other years because in  1976 more 
than 7 percent of decedents had to file federal estate tax returns, whereas since 
1982 fewer than 2 percent have had to file. These data may suggest that the 
next five percentiles of decedents bequeath 75 percent as much wealth as the 
wealthiest 2 percent of decedents. These figures are comparable to those for 
Japan when one recognizes that table 10.10 generally represents the wealthi- 
est 6 percent of Japanese decedents and the figures for the United States from 
the 1980s represent the wealthiest 1 to 2 percent. 
This estimate for the United States likely substantially understates reality. 
As  noted above, we  have used for our measure of  household wealth an ad- 
justed  version  of  the  Federal  Reserve’s  accounting of  household  wealth, 
which includes the financial holdings of  tax-exempt organizations. For ex- 
ample, for 1984 the generational bequest ratio would be  even greater if the 265  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
PSID or SIPP wealth data, which do not include tax exempt organizations, 
were  used.  In  addition, many  observers  believe  that  the  U.S.  estate  tax  is 
ineffectual  in  taxing  intergenerational  wealth  transfers.  See, for example, 
Cooper (1979), Bernheim (1987), and Munnell (1988). They argue that sub- 
stantial opportunities exist for legal tax avoidance. 
We  attempt to estimate adjusted generational bequest ratios for net wealth 
while recognizing  that many nonfiling decedents  make bequests by the fol- 
lowing procedure. We use  1987 deaths (1988 filing) as our base year. From 
the  almost 2.2 million  deaths in  the  United  States that  year,  some 43,000 
estate tax returns were filed. We assume that 42 percent of  the remaining 2.1 
million decedents were males aged 55 or older. We let K represent the fraction 
of  the  $600,000  exemption level  that  the  average  nonfiling  decedent  be- 
queathed.  (A  value  of  K  = 1  corresponds  to  an  average  bequest  of 
$600,000.) The value of  such bequests is then divided by the  1987 value of 
net household assets and multiplied by 25. If we assume that all such bequests 
either go directly  to the next generation  or that  any  bequest  received  by  a 
surviving  spouse is not consumed and ultimately bequeathed  intact, further 
adjustment is not necessary. This is equivalent to the case of MM = 1 in table 
10.16. In addition, we assume that each male decedent bequeaths 40 percent 
of his estate to a surviving  spouse and the surviving spouse consumes  half 
(MM = 0.5) or all (MM = 0) of the bequest.  To these results,  we add the 
corresponding 1987 adjusted generational bequest ratios of the estate tax fil- 
ers. Table 10.17 reports the results. 
Obviously, a value of K  = 1  is unlikely to represent the average bequest of 
nonfilers.  However, we observe that the SIPP data report that for 1984 the 
median net worth of householders aged 55 to 64 was $130,498 and for house- 
holders age 65 and older,  $104,851. With  growth in net worth, this would 
imply a value of  K  of  at least 0.2. We  would  hazard the guess that  in the 
United States at least one-quarter of national wealth is transferred from one 
generation to the next. 
To  add some perspective,  recall that for MM = 1, for 1976, the genera- 
tional bequest  ratio was  18.33. If  all nonfiling  decedents  made  an average 
bequest  of $6,000 (K = 0.2), the generational  bequest ratio equals 20.27. 
This is only modestly lower than the similar calculation for 1987 decedents in 
table 10.17. 
10.7  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
We  have compared the transfer taxation  systems in Japan and the United 
States, and we have estimated the amount of transfers through bequests. We 
also have estimated the share of bequeathed assets in total household assets in 
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Table 10.17  Estimates of Bequeathed Household Assets in Proportion to 
Outstanding Assets, United States (%) 
Adjusted Generational Bequest Ratio 
K  MM=  1  MM =  0.5  MM=O 
0.0  10.10  8.08 
0.1  19.50  15.60 
0.2  28.89  23.11 
0.3  38.29  30.63 
0.4  47.69  38.15 
0.5  57.08  45.67 
0.6  66.48  53.18 
0.7  75.88  60.70 
0.8  85.27  68.22 
0.9  94.67  75.73 












In both countries, all bequeathed property of  the decedent becomes subject 
to bequest or estate tax. However,  the estate tax in the United  States is im- 
posed on the bequeathed estate (the donor side), while the bequest tax of Ja- 
pan is imposed on beneficiaries of the bequest (the donee side). In Japan, there 
are presumed  heirs, called statutory heirs.  As the number of statutory heirs 
becomes large, so that the per person bequest becomes small, the tax burden 
is reduced.  There is no such system in the United States, that is, the size of 
the estate determines the basic tax liability. In Japan, at least up to a half of 
bequeathed property may be given to a spouse tax free, while in the United 
States any bequest to a spouse is tax free. 
Land and real estate are assessed for bequest tax purposes at a value sub- 
stantially lower than the market value in Japan. There is no such favorable 
treatment  in the United  States. This incentive  induces the Japanese elderly 
who intend to bequeath to invest heavily in real estate. At least three-quarters 
of  the Japanese taxable bequest is in real estate. Only one-quarter of the U.S. 
taxable bequest is in real estate. 
This paper does not distinguish between intended and unintended bequests. 
If unintended  capital  gains occurred, in particular  in the value of  land and 
housing, in favor of the elderly, then it may be difficult for the elderly to real- 
ize the gain in the form of an additional annuity in a world of imperfect mar- 
kets. Land inflation in Japan would tend to increase the amount of unintended 
bequests.  However, the relatively  stable ratio, through time, of  land in be- 
queathed  property  value  implies  that  a  significant portion  of  bequest  was 
planned. 
In the United States, the ratio of taxable deaths to total deaths is much lower 
than in Japan, so that our simulations are very sensitive to the parameter K. 
Suppose that on average $120,000 (that is, 20 percent of the maximum basic 267  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of Household Wealth 
deduction)  is bequeathed  by the nontaxable decedents in the United  States. 
Then at least one-quarter of household assets in the United States are obtained 
by intergenerational transfers, as opposed to live-cycle hump saving. 
From the Japanese Family Saving Survey and Basic Life Survey, we con- 
sider that on average Y  24 million, that is, 40 percent of the maximum basic 
deduction, is bequeathed by an average nontaxable (male) decedent (of age 50 
or more). Then, at least 30 to 40 percent of the household wealth and 40 to 60 
percent of land were formed by intergenerational transfer. 
Our  results  from  our most  preferred  case  for Japan  (K = 0.426 with 
U  = 0.56) and the United States (K  between 0.2 and 0.3) show that the ratio 
of transferred  saving as opposed to life-cycle saving is somewhat greater in 
Japan than in the United States. Hayashi, Ando, and Ferris (1988) have con- 
jectured that  the higher  Japanese  saving rate is due to nondissaving of  the 
elderly. Their conjecture would be consistent with the results derived here. 
However, for some simulations the United States ratio is higher than  the 
Japanese. Given the high Japanese personal saving rate, this may be counter- 
intuitive. We offer two factors that raise the U.S.  ratio of  transferred assets 
compared to the Japanese ratio. First, social security and corporate pensions, 
which essentially  constitute  a form of  life-cycle saving, do not show up as 
household assets while accumulating prior to retirement. This lowers the de- 
nominator of  the transferred  assets to total asset ratio. To  the extent that the 
United States has more social security and corporate pension plans than does 
Japan, the ratio is biased comparatively upward in the United States. (If pen- 
sions, or retirement severance payments, are unfunded, and the liabilities are 
reflected  in the value of corporate stock, which is ultimately owned by the 
household sector, then the bias would disappear.) 
Second, corporate pensions in the United States are predominantly distrib- 
uted  as an annuity,  while the Japanese  corporate  pensions  are traditionally 
paid as a lump-sum severance payment upon retirement. With lump-sum dis- 
tribution, household  assets in Japan typically increase upon retirement,  that 
is, at age 55 to 60. This would increase the denominator of the ratio. More- 
over, a lump-sum payment as opposed to an annuity payment leaves a larger 
possibility of intended and unintended bequests. 
Our results suggest that in both Japan and the United  States a substantial 
portion of the national capital stock is the result of intended and unintended 
intergenerational transfers.  Kotlikoff and Summers (198 1) suggested that be- 
tween  15 and 70 percent  of  the American  capital  stock resulted  from such 
transfers and argued that, in fact, the intergenerational transfers were primar- 
ily responsible  for the existing capital stock. Utilizing a different methodol- 
ogy, our preferred cases suggest that for the United States and Japan between 
25 and 40 percent of the capital stock results from intergenerational transfers, 
which is roughly the middle of the Kotlikoff and Summers range. Whether our 
calculations or those of Kotlikoff and Summers are closer to the truth requires 
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Appendix A 
Transfer Taxation in Japan 
Historical Background9 
Japan established its first transfer tax in 1905. Until  1949, it was an estate 
tax, in that the tax base was the value of properties of the decedent. In 1950, 
in accordance with the tax mission of  Carl Shoup, it became an accession tax, 
in that the tax was imposed on the recipient of inherited properties, gifts, or 
bequests,  and the value of  properties used as the tax base was computed cu- 
mulatively over the recipient’s lifetime. The 1953 revision divided the acces- 
sion tax into an inheritance tax and a gift tax, and the method of  cumulative 
taxation was repealed. 
The gift tax was introduced as a complement to the inheritance tax. Without 
the gift tax, one could distribute one’s wealth to one’s heirs prior to death in 
order to avoid or reduce the inheritance tax burden. Each heir (or donee in the 
case of the gift tax) was separately liable for the tax on the property received. 
Hence, how  wealth  was distributed  among heirs (or donees) could  make a 
great difference in the total tax burden.  In some cases, distribution was dis- 
torted in order to reduce the tax burden. 
In 1958, the system was revised, so that the inheritance tax is calculated on 
the basis of the total property bequeathed  and the number of  statutory heirs 
(and not distribution among them or nonstatutory heirs). The 1988 tax reform 
included  revision  of  inheritance  and gift tax  schedules  and  some revisions 
closing  loopholes. The method  of  calculating  the  bequest  tax  will  be  ex- 
plained in detail below. 
Taxpayers 
Residency status and location of  the transferred property determine poten- 
tial tax liability. An individual who acquires property by inheritance, bequest, 
or gift and who has a domicile in Japan at the time of  acquisition of  such 
property is an “unlimited taxpayer.” An individual who acquires any property 
located in Japan by inheritance, bequest, or gift and who has no domicile in 
Japan at the time of acquisition of the property is a “limited taxpayer” (Min- 
istry of Finance 1990). 
An  unlimited  taxpayer  is  responsible  for all  bequeathed  assets, located 
either in Japan or in foreign countries.  A limited taxpayer is responsible for 
bequeathed assets located only in Japan, but not those in foreign countries. A 
Japanese national employed in Japan is an unlimited taxpayer even if he or she 
is temporarily traveling or residing in a foreign country (Ministry of Finance 
1990). 
Note that the inheritance tax in Japan is paid by those who receive proper- 
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ties as opposed to the estate of  the decedent in  the United States. Benefi- 
ciaries, however, have to mutually agree on how to divide the properties. The 
inheritance tax form signed by beneficiaries is usually filed at the Tax Bureau’s 
branch that covers the residence of the decedent. Inheritance and gift taxes in 
Japan are a national tax. The same rate schedule, exemptions, and tax credit 
applies to all properties in Japan. No local government may impose additional 
bequest or gift tax. 
Statutory Heirs and Statutory Shares 
The Japanese civil law concept of “statutory heir” is critical to an under- 
standing of  the inheritance tax. There are three mutually exclusive ways to 
calculate the number of  statutory heirs. (1) Lineal descendants. When there 
are surviving children, the spouse and children become statutory heirs. If 
there are no surviving children, but grandchildren are alive, the grandchildren 
substitute for the children. (2) Lineal ascendants. When there are no children 
(or grandchildren), the spouse and the parents of  the deceased constitute stat- 
utory heirs.  (3)  Lateral. When there are no children and parents, statutory 
heirs consist of the spouse and brothers and sisters of the decedent. 
The total number of statutory heirs determines the size of the basic exemp- 
tion (explained below). The concept of  statutory heirs also determines an es- 
tate’s “statutory shares” (Civil Law,  article 900). In case 1, the spouse is en- 
titled to half the estate and each child is entitled to the other half divided by 
the number of  children.1° In case 2, the spouse is entitled to two-thirds and 
parents receive one-third (or each parent receives a half of one-third). In case 
3,  the spouse is entitled to three-quarters, and surviving siblings receive one- 
quarter (or each brother and sister receives one-quarter divided by  the total 
number of surviving siblings). 
When no will exists, heirs may mutually decide how to divide the property 
(Civil Law, article 902). However, when heirs cannot reach a mutually accept- 
able agreement on the division of property the statutory shares actually deter- 
mine the division of property (Civil Law, articles 900, 901). Moreover, even 
if  the decedent leaves a will specifying transfer of  the entire estate to a sole 
recipient, statutory heirs may sue for the automatic entitlement of bequest, 
that is, a half of  statutory share.” More important, regardless of  the actual 
10.  A child born out of wedlock, or born to a different spouse, is entitled to only a half of a 
share of child. 
11.  A dying person cannot control the distribution of  bequeathed property. One-half of the 
statutory share is reserved for each statutory heir, no matter how the dying person wishes to 
distribute his or her property postmortem (Civil Law, article 1028). (In the case where there is no 
child, grandchild,  or spouse, the guaranteed share of the parents of the decedent is one-third.) 
This guaranteed minimum share is called iryubun. (Pjichrreil in German, and rdserve in French. 
There is no word in Anglo-Saxon law.) From the perspective of a strategic bequest motive (Bem- 
heim,  Shleifer, and Summers 1985). iryubun creates a very weak threat point for the parents. 
Unless parents have illiquid assets, such as land and structures, heirs are assured of wealth transfer 
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distribution of property, the statutory  shares determine the total  inheritance 
tax liability. 
Taxable Property, Exemptions, and Tax Base 
The inheritance tax base is equal to the value of  all the property owned by 
the decedent at the time of his or her death, including any life insurance and 
severance payments paid upon death. Benefits of life insurance or accidental 
death insurance are included, provided that the decedent had paid insurance 
premiums. In addition, all gifts made during the last three years of  life are 
added to the total.I2 From this total, the funeral expenses, liabilities of  the 
decedent, and exemptions for charity, life insurance, and retirement severance 
are subtracted. Lastly, the basic exemption is subtracted from this amount to 
determine total taxable property. 
The bequeathed properties, securities, and real estate are in principle valued 
at the fair market price. However, there are two well-known deviations from 
the principle. Real estate, such as residential land and land and structures for 
self-employed  business, is in practice  assessed  less  than  the  market  price, 
partly because there is a special provision for small property and partly be- 
cause, in practice, assessments for inheritance purposes are underestimated. 
The former aspect is a provision  for the  small sites for residence  or for 
business, such as rental housing. The assessment for the portion of 200 square 
meters of such property is reduced by 50 percent, and by 60 percent for busi- 
ness sites.  If  the property  was partly residential and partly for business, the 
business portion  is reduced  by 60  percent and the residential  portion  is re- 
duced by 40 percent, provided that the average rate is above 50 percent. 
The second source of undervaluation is entirely due to ministerial practice. 
Land, which is a major portion of real properties  in Japan, for bequest  pur- 
poses is assessed by a valuation map (known as Rosen Ka) in the Tax Bureau’s 
office. This is different from the land price survey (known as Koji Kakaku) 
done by the Land Agency of the Japanese government, or the land valuation 
for real estate (property) tax (imposed by municipal government). This prob- 
lem will be discussed later. 
Another provision effectively underassesses the value of agricultural land. 
This is accomplished by a special deferment and eventual exemption of inher- 
itance tax if a beneficiary continues agriculture on that piece of property. This 
will be explained later. 
There are four major categories for special exemptions from the inheritance 
tax. Property acquired through inheritance by a person or an organization en- 
gaged in religious, charitable, scientific, or other activities for public welfare 
in equilibrium. In contrast, if the parent-heir relationship is essentially a cooperative game involv- 
ing an exchange of terminal care and bequest, then the ityubun works as a precommitment that 
would increase the utility of both the elderly and the heirs-to-be. However, an economic analysis 
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and to be used for public purposes is exempt from taxation. Payment from the 
mutual aid systems for handicapped persons carried out by  local public enti- 
ties according to their regulations is exempt from taxation. 
Although life insurance payments and severance payments are included in 
property value, there are deductions for those payments. (Corporate severance 
payments are prevalent in Japan. The onetime, lump-sum payments upon re- 
tirement usually amount to three times annual salary. They play the role of 
annuity and pensions for U.S.  workers.) A tax credit to each of  these pay- 
ments is equal to Y  5 million times the number of statutory heirs.  l3 
In addition to special exemptions, all bequests benefit from a basic exemp- 
tion.  The basic exemption under current law  is  Y40  million + (Y8  mil- 
lion  x  the number of statutory heirs).  l4 
Tax Base, Tax Table, and Calculation of Tax 
The total amount of inheritance tax owed by all heirs is determined as fol- 
lows. First, assign the total tax base (property values after all exemptions) to 
each statutory heir by the statutory share (defined above). Then apply the tax 
schedule shown above in table 10.1 to the assigned amount for each heir (that 
is, the total tax base times statutory share) to calculate a tax amount for each 
heir. Deduct any tax credit (to be explained shortly) from this individual tax 
amount. Then sum up the individual tax amounts to the total inheritance tax 
liability. Below we provide an example of  how to calculate and distribute in- 
heritance tax liability to clarify any questions arising from this description. 
Tax Credit and Surcharge 
Spouse Provision 
A surviving spouse receives a special property value deductible that works 
like a tax credit. If  a surviving spouse inherits property,-she  or he may deduct 
12. If a beneficiary of inheritance received properties by  gift from the deceased within three 
years before his or her death, the value of  such properties are included in the value of total prop- 
erties bequeathed. The gift tax with respect to such properties is credited against the inheritance 
tax due to the beneficiary. This eliminates the potential double taxation of the gift. Although the 
marginal tax rate for gifts is higher than that of the inheritance tax if the same amount is given, it 
is possible to lower the total tax burden if  only a portion of the intended bequest is given as an 
inter vivos transfer near death. This provision is intended to deter a near-death rush to divide up 
properties. 
13. There were changes in the amounts of  these types of exemptions in the 1988 reform. The 
old exemption (1975-87)  for severance pay due at death was  Y 2 million  X  number of statutory 
heirs; the new  exemption (1988-present)  is  Y5  million  x  number of  statutory heirs. The old 
exemption for life insurance payments was Y2.5  million  x  number of statutory heirs; the new 
exemption is Y5  million  x  number of statutory heirs. 
14.  History of basic deduction: (in million yen) 1958-61,  1.5 + (0.3 x  number of statutory 
heirs); 1962-65,  2.5 + (0.5  X  number of statutory heirs); 1966-70.4.0  + (0.8  X  number of 
statutory heirs)  + (4.0 maximum spouse allowance); 1971-72,  6.0 + (0.8 X  number of statu- 
tory heirs)  + (4.0 maximum spouse allowance); 1973-74,  6.0 + (1.2 X  number of statutory 
heirs)  + (6.0 maximum  spouse  allowance);  1975-87,  20.0 + (4.0 X  number  of  statutory 
heirs); 1988-present,  40.0 + (8.0  X  number of statutory heirs). 272  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
from her or his inheritance taxable property value the following amount (but 
not exceeding the inheritance tax less any applicable gift tax credit): 
Min (Max [ V 80 million,  spouse’s 
statutory share times taxable 
property value], value of  property 
actually given to spouse) 
Total 
Tax credit - inheritance 
for spouse  &ax  Total taxable property value 
-  X 
In order to understand the above formula with respect  to the spouse’s tax 
liability, it is instructive to consider several scenarios. First, if the spouse ac- 
tually inherits only up to the portion of statutory share, the inherited amount 
is free from inheritance tax, however  large the property is. This is a revised 
clause from the 1988 tax reform. In the old formula, this part read “a half of 
taxable property  value.” The consequences  of the new  and old clause differ 
when there are no children as statutory heirs, since the statutory share of  the 
spouse becomes  greater  than  one-half  in  such a case. Second, even  if  the 
spouse actually inherits more than a statutory share, a bequest to the spouse 
of  less than  Y 80 million is again free from inheritance tax. The amount was 
raised from Y40  million in the 1988 tax reform. (This revision was commen- 
surate with other revisions of other deductible amounts in the inheritance tax.) 
Tax Credit to Certain Heirs and Certain Kinds of  Property 
After the bequest tax is calculated, there are several provisions for tax credit 
(table 10A.l).  First, if the beneficiary is a child of the decedent and a minor 
(under age twenty), the tax liability is reduced by  Y60,OOO for each year the 
child is short of  his or her twentieth birthday.  Second, if  a beneficiary  is a 
handicapped child of the decedent, a further tax reduction is provided.  The 
credit equals Y60,OOO times the number of years until the handicapped child 
attains age seventy. The amount doubles for the severely handicapped. 
Other Tax Credits 
Recall that any gifts that were made within three years prior to the death are 
counted toward an inheritance property value. In order to avoid double taxa- 
tion, the gift tax paid for such gifts is applied as tax credit for inheritance tax. 
If the decedent had received property by inheritance within ten years of his 
or her death, a certain percentage  of  inheritance tax is reduced  for the new 
Table 10A.l  Tax Credit Summary (in yen) 
Old (1975-87)  New (1988-present) 
Handicapped  (70 -  age) x 30,000  (70 -  age) x 60,000 
Severely handicapped  (70  -age)  x 60,000  (70 -age)  x 120,000 
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beneficiary.  This alleviates  an excess burden  imposed by the succession of 
inheritance from one generation to the grandchildren’s generation.  The for- 
mula is complicated; an interested reader should consult a detailed tax book 
(Ministry of Finance 1989). 
Surcharge 
If  a beneficiary is not a child (or a grandchild if  there are no children),  a 
parent, or a spouse of a child (or a grandchild if there are no children), then 
there is a 20 percent surcharge on the amount of  tax calculated above. This 
provision  works against a generation-skipping  inheritance  as well  as lucky 
strangers. 
Example 
Suppose that a property valued at Y  200 million is bequeathed to a spouse 
and four children. (This example is taken from Ministry of Finance  [1990, 
1291, but case C is added to take into account a second bequest from a spouse 
to children.) The amount of basic exemption is Y40  million (a constant) plus 
Y 8 million times 5 (a spouse and four children), for a total of  Y  80 million. 
Assuming  no other exemptions, the tax base is Y  120 million  (200 - 80). 
Next, the statutory share assigns the following distribution of tax base: for the 
spouse,  Y60 million (120 x  V2); for each child, Y  15 million (120 x  %I). 
Applying  the tax  table, individual  tax  amounts  are  Y  17.3 million  for the 
spouse and  Y2.45 million for each child. The total tax liability, before tax 
credit, is thus, Y27.1 million (17.3 + 2.45  X  4). 
Case A. Suppose that heirs decide to actually distribute the property of  Y  200 
million  according to the statutory  share.  Each  child receives  Y25 million 
(100/4). The spouse tax credit applies in full, so there is zero tax liability for 
the spouse. Assuming no other tax credits, each child’s tax liability is Y27.1 
million multiplied by (25/200), or Y3.3875 million. The total tax liability is 
Y  13.55 million. 
Case B. A confusing case arises when the actual distribution of the property 
deviates  from the  statutory  share. The key in  such a case is that  the total 
tax liability,  Y27.1 million, does not change. Suppose that the actual distri- 
bution of the property is such that the spouse receives a half (that is, Y 100 
million)  as in case A, but  four children, say C,, C,,  C,,  and C,,  receive 
Y40,  Y30,  Y20, and  YlO million,  respectively.  Then the actual tax  li- 
ability becomes, for C,, 27.1  X  (‘%o~)  =  Y5.42 million; for C,,  27.1  x 
(30/2~) =  Y4.065 million; for C,, 27.1  X  (2%~)  = Y2.71 million; and for 
C,,  27.1  X  10/2~)  = Y  1.355 million. The total tax liability remains Y  13.55 
million. 
Case C.  Note that Cases A and B consider only one aspect of intergenerational 
transfers.  Suppose case A, and assume that the surviving spouse dies some 274  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
years  later without  spending the  Y100 million.  Then that  amount is be- 
queathed to the four children. The basic deduction this time is  Y72 million 
(40 + (8 x  4)).  Hence the total tax base is Y28 million (100 - 72), imply- 
ing that each statutory heir is responsible for Y7  million (28/4). From the tax 
table, that would trigger a tax liability of Y0.85 million per person, for a total 
inheritance tax of  Y3.4  million. Hence, the total inheritance tax on the inter- 
generational transfer (in two transactions) is Y  13.55 plus Y  3.4 million for a 
total of Y  16.95  million on a Y200 million estate. 
Special 'Ikeatment and Agricultural Land 
When a farmer bequeaths farmland to an heir and the heir continues to use 
the land in an agricultural (family) business, the inheritance tax on the differ- 
ence between the value as an agricultural land and the value otherwise may be 
deferred, and will be exempted if  (1) the beneficiary  continues agricultural 
use for twenty years after the inheritance,  (2) the beneficiary  dies, or (3) the 
beneficiary makes a gift to a person who continues farming. 
Suppose that there is a parcel of land in a residential area. It is not produc- 
tive as an agricultural business, so that its value as agricultural land would be 
relatively  low.  (In practice, the value is calculated  as  a present discounted 
value of  agricultural  income from the land.) However,  if  it is converted  to 
residential use, the market value would be ten times its agricultural value. An 
heir generally would be better off  to continue farming for twenty years to gain 
an exemption from the inheritance tax for most of the land value. After twenty 
years, the heir may sell at the higher market price.  If the heir quits farming 
before ten years, a recapture provision for higher tax applies. 
Filing Requirement 
After these calculations, those who do not owe any inheritance tax are not 
required to report to the Tax Bureau's office, except for a spouse who benefits 
from the special spouse tax credit to become nontaxable. The filing has to be 
completed  within  six months of  death. If  mistakes in filing are found later, 
corrections may be submitted. 
Inheritance Tax Distortion 
Token Adoption 
It is apparent from the calculation of the inheritance tax that the number of 
statutory heirs plays an important role. The number of statutory heirs need not 
equal the true number of heirs. More statutory heirs reduces total inheritance 
taxes imposed upon actual heirs. This is independent of  how a decedent actu- 
ally divides his or her properties. Three features of the inheritance tax produce 
this  result. First, the  basic  exemption  depends on the number  of  statutory 
heirs. Second, the total property value after exemptions is divided by the num- 
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tax credit for life insurance payment and severance payment depends on the 
number of statutory heirs. 
Hence, a family may reduce inheritance tax payments by adopting children 
to increase  the  number of  statutory  heirs, with  an  understanding  that  the 
adopted children receive only a nominal compensation for this service. This 
loophole  was  widely  recognized  and exploited  by  wealthy  families.  Table 
10.8 reveals a strong correlation between the size of the estate and the number 
of statutory heirs. 
To close this loophole, the 1988 revision included a cap on the number of 
adopted  children  counted toward  statutory  heirs.  Under  the  new  rule,  an 
adopted heir may be counted as a statutory heir only if the adopted heir is (1) 
a biological child of the spouse of the decedent; (2)  a grandchild (if there is no 
child); or (3) an adopted child under the special adoption clause (Civil Law, 
article 817, 2-1  1);l5 and (4) the only adopted heir or one of only two adopted 
heirs, if there is no adopted heir in (1)-(3),  a natural child, or a grandchild. 
However,  the effective  date for this change was not  until  December  31, 
1988, unlike most other changes, which became effective on January 1,  1988. 
Hence, we have to wait one more year to see what difference this tax reform 
has made. 
Use of Real Estate 
As explained in the text, real estate is a good vehicle for integenerational 
transfers. The value of real estate is in practice assessed at about half to two- 
thirds of  the market value. In addition, assessments on up to 200 square me- 
ters of bequeathed residential property are further reduced by 50 percent (60 
percent for business). 
Bequests carried in the form of real estate are subject to less inheritance tax 
than those carried in the form of securities.  Moreover, since the amount of 
debt is deductible in full, an effective way to reduce inheritance tax is to bor- 
row a large sum of money to purchase real property, preferably shortly before 
death, so that the property is still highly leveraged at the time of  intergenera- 
tional transfer. 
To curtail  such tax planning, the  1988 tax reform mandated that any real 
estate (land and structures, excluding the decedent’s personal residence) pur- 
chased within three years of the date of death is assessed at its purchase price. 
(This is evidence that the tax authorities admit that assessed value is in prac- 
tice less than the market value.) This rule still permits a tax advantage in a 
period of high land inflation. This change is also effective as of  December 3 1, 
1988. 
We expect that this kind of tax incentive will manifest itself in land’s repre- 
15. The special adoption clause was introduced in  1987 to make children adopted at an early 
age (younger than six years) have rights and obligations in the family relationship similar to bio- 
logical children. Unlike traditional adoption,  special adoption severs the child’s ties with his or 
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senting a larger fraction of bequests than otherwise. First, the share of land in 
tax-filing bequeathed property value is higher than the share of land in out- 
standing property value of a household. In 1988, the former was 69 percent, 
while  the  latter was 53 percent.  Second, the  share of  land  in the value of 
bequeathed property is higher in Japan than in the United States. 
Gift Tax 
A person may receive a gift of up to  Y600,000 a year free of  gift tax. In 
addition,  without  gift  tax,  a  spouse  who  has  been  married  for more than 
twenty years may receive a gift of residential property of up to Y20 million 
for personal use or a financial gift up to  Y20 million toward a purchase of 
residential property for personal use. This clause was created in 1966 with a 
twenty-five-year  marriage requirement and with a  Y  1.6 million deductible. 
The  requirement  had  been  twenty  years  since  1971,  and  the  deductible 
amount was Y  10 million from 1975 to 1988. 
A gift beyond these exemptions is subject to gift tax according to the tax 
schedule in  table  10A.2. Table  10A.3 shows the  gift tax  filings for recent 
years. 
Table 10A.2  Gift Tax Table (in millions of yen, beyond exemptions) 
Old Taxable Transfer  New Taxable Transfer 
(1975-87)  ( 1988-present) 
More  But Less  MTR  More  But Less  MTR 
Than  Than  (%)  Than  Than  (%) 
~  ~  - 
0.0  0.5  10  0.0  1 .o  10 
0.5  0.7  15  1 .o  I .5  15 
0.7  1 .o  20  1.5  2.0  25 
I .o  1.4  25  2.0  3.0  30 
1.4  2.0  30  3.0  4.0  35 
2.0  2.8  35  4.0  6.0  40 
2.8  4.0  40  6.0  8.0  45 
4.0  5.5  45  8.0  12.0  50 
5.5  8  .O  50  12.0  20.0  55 
8.0  13.0  55  20.0  30.0  60 
13.0  20.0  60  30.0  70.0  65 
70  20.0  35 .O  65  70.0  - 
35.0  70.0  70 
75  70.0  - 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, An Outline of  Japanese Taxes (various issues). 277  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
Table 10A.3  Gift Tax Filing Record (in billions of yen) 
~~ 
1986  1987  1988 
Gift property value  960.600  1,418.543  1,109.786 
Spouse exemption  165.018  357.432  179.096 
Basic exemption  252.259  303.400  275.873 
Tax base  543.21  3  172.927  653.528 
Gift tax  151.858  225.454  168.670 
Note: There was a tax reform (reduction) in  1988. 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tax Bureau, Tax Bureau Statistics Annual (various years) 
Appendix B 
Transfer Taxation in the United States 
Overview 
United  States law  formally  structures the gift and estate taxes as excise 
taxes on the transfer of wealth.16 A gift tax is imposed on transfers by gift 
during life, and an estate tax is imposed on transfers at death. The gift and 
estate taxes  are a unified transfer tax  system in that one progressive  tax  is 
imposed on the cumulative transfers during the lifetime and at death. 
In theory, the tax applies to a family’s wealth once per generation.  In its 
present configuration, U.S. transfer taxes treat husband and wife as a family 
unit for purposes of transfers. Transfers between spouses are free of tax. How- 
ever, the husband and wife independently use the basic exemption and tax rate 
schedule. 
Taxable Estate and Taxable Gift 
A decedent’s gross estate is the market value of all the decedent’s assets.” 
The law  permits  an unlimitied deduction  for transfers  between  spouses. In 
addition,  transfers  and bequests  to charities  are  deductible.  Is  Funeral  and 
burial expenses and expenses of administration of the estate are also deduct- 
ible. Consequently, in its simplest terms, the taxable estate is the market value 
of all assets less the estate’s expenses, charitable bequests, and transfers to the 
surviving spouse. 
An  individual may  make annual gifts of $10,000 to any other individual 
16.  This is a consequence of  an  1895 Supreme Court decision that invalidated the existing 
income tax, which treated gifts and inheritances as income and taxable as such. Congress enacted 
the current form of the estate tax in 1916. To eliminate avoidance through inter vivos transfers, 
Congress enacted the gift tax in 1932. 
17.  Special-use valuation of farm and other property is discussed in the main text and below. 
18. Transfers are charitable only if they go to qualifying organizations. The Internal Revenue 
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without being subject to tax.19 A husband and wife may jointly make $20,000 
of tax-free gifts to each recipient. For example, a husband and wife with three 
children may annually transfer $20,000 to each child free of  any gift tax, for 
a total of  $60,000 in tax-free transfers.  Moreover, a husband  and wife may 
transfer $20,000 annually to each child for as long as they live. Such transfers 
are free from transfer taxes, and they do not constitute taxable income to the 
children.  A  program  of  annual  giving permits  the  transfer of  considerable 
wealth free of  tax. Our hypothetical  husband  and  wife could transfer $1.2 
million tax free to their three children over a twenty-year period. 
Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 the treatment of  inter- 
spousal  transfers  and  other gifts  was  not  quite as liberal.  At  that  time the 
annual gift tax exclusion was $3,000 ($6,000 for joint gifts). The entire value 
of the first $100,000 of lifetime transfers between spouses was exempt from 
tax. Thereafter, a deduction was allowed for 50 percent of  interspousal life- 
time transfers in excess of  $200,000. The estate tax marital deduction gener- 
ally was equal to the greater of  $250,000 or one-half of the decedent's  ad- 
justed gross estate. 
Rates and Unified Credit 
Under present law, the gift and estate tax rates begin at  18 percent on the 
first $10,000 of taxable transfers and reach 55 percent on transfers over $3 
million.20 In addition, for transfers between $10 million and $21 ,040,000,2' 
the benefits of the lower rates and the unified schedule are phased out at a rate 
of  5 percent, making the effective  marginal  tax  rate 60 percent.  After this 
phase-out range, the marginal and average tax rate equals 55 percent. 
The cumulative  amount of  any gift or estate tax  is reduced by  a unified 
credit.  The gift or estate tax  is first computed without any exemption, and 
then the unified credit is subtracted to determine the amount of  gift or estate 
tax payable before the allowance of other credits. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 
created a unified credit of $47,000, which had the effect of exempting trans- 
fers of up to $175,625 from tax. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981 
increased the credit in six annual steps to $192,800, which has the effect of 
exempting transfers of up to $600,000 from tax.22  As a consequence, the first 
dollar of  a taxable estate faces a 37 percent marginal tax rate.23  The unified 
19.  Payment of  qualifying educational expenses, such as the tuition and fees charged by  a 
university, and medical expenses do not count toward the annual limit. 
20.  In  1993 the top rate is scheduled to be reduced to 50 percent. Prior to  1981, the top rate 
was 70 percent for transfers in excess of $5 million. Brackets at 60 and 65 percent also existed. 
The reduction from a top rate of  70 percent to the current rate structure was phased in. 
21.  $18,340,000 after 1992. 
22.  The unified credit was $62,800 for 1982, $79,300 for 1983, $96,300 for 1984. $121,800 
for 1985, and $155,800 for 1986. 
23.  The rate structure for transfers of less than $600,000, reported above, has been retained 
over the past fifteen years. Lower-end relief has been provided by  increases in the unified credit. 
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credit is not indexed for inflation. Tax liability accounts for any prior gift taxes 
paid or unified credit claimed. 
While the gift and estate taxes are unified and unlimited tax-free transfers 
are permitted between spouses, the husband and wife do not jointly face one 
tax rate schedule for transfers of household wealth. This implies that simple 
tax planning can reduce significantly taxes on transfers. Suppose a husband 
and wife receive an annuity that provides  for their living expenses and the 
husband owns $1.2 million of assets. The husband could bequeath all assets 
to  his  wife, and his estate  would  pay  no tax.  Upon  the  wife’s subsequent 
death, however, $1.2 million would be in her estate. After using the unified 
credit,  the estate  would owe $235,000 in tax,  and $965,000  would be be- 
queathed to  their children.  The superior strategy is for the  husband  to  be- 
queath $600,000 to his wife, which is untaxed under the marital deduction, 
and to bequeath $600,000 to their children,  which is untaxed by his estate’s 
use of the unified credit. Upon the wife’s subsequent death, her estate could 
transfer the remaining $600,000 to their children free of tax as her estate uses 
the unified credit.  With an increasing marginal tax rate schedule, equal be- 
quests from each spouse minimize the total tax burden. 
A limited credit is available for any state death or inheritance taxes paid.24 
The state credit works as revenue sharing with the states, encouraging them to 
establish a death tax at least to soak up the benefit of the dollars that the federal 
government would otherwise tax. Twenty-six states impose only a so-called 
soak-up or pick-up tax. For example, Florida has such a tax. Nine states, for 
example, New  York,  impose  estate  taxes  in  excess  of  what  is  creditable 
against the federal estate tax, thereby increasing the total tax burden. Another 
eighteen states, for example, Pennsylvania, impose a bequest tax in addition 
to an estate soak-up tax.25  Such taxes also increase the total tax burden. 
Tax-Inclusive versus Tax-Exclusive Rate Structures 
While the credit is unified, the rate structure is not. The estate tax is calcu- 
lated on a tax-inclusive basis while the gift tax is calculated on a tax-exclusive 
basis. What this means is that, for transfers from an estate, bequests are paid 
from the after-tax estate.  The tax is “included”  in the estate.  For gifts, the 
amount transferred defines the tax base. The tax is “excluded” from the gift 
received by the beneficiary.  Hence, to think of  the gross of tax transfer, one 
must gross up the gift by the tax subsequently paid. 
Assume Smith has $1.5 million in wealth and that the transfer tax rate is 50 
24. The current state death tax credit provides a credit for state death taxes up to 80 percent of 
the tax imposed by the 1926 federal tax rate schedule. It is somewhat of  a historical anomaly, but 
its more than sixty-year existence and the off-budget revenue sharing it provides make it unlikely 
that it will be modified in the future, although an attempt was made to convert it to a deduction in 
1987. 
25.  The U.S.  Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1991) describes the es- 
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percent.  Assume Smith wants to transfer wealth to Jones.  If  Smith accom- 
plishes the transfer by bequest, Smith’s estate applies the 50 percent tax rate 
(inclusive) and pays $750,000 to the government.  Jones receives $750,000. 
However,  if  Smith made a gift  to Jones of  $1 million,  a 50 percent  tax  is 
assessed (exclusive) on the gift, and Smith must pay $500,000 to the govern- 
ment. Smith faced an effective tax rate of 50 percent on his wealth when trans- 
ferred through his estate and an effective tax rate of  33 percent on his wealth 
when transferred by gift. 
Taxation of Life Insurance 
In the  main text we explained  that the gross estate does not  include the 
proceeds of a life insurance policy if the decedent, at least three years prior to 
death, irrevocably designates beneficiaries of the policy and transfers all other 
incidents of ownership to another person.  Such a strategy effectively avoids 
all estate taxes but not  necessarily  gift taxes, as payments  of  the insurance 
premium may be a taxable gift. For example, if a father pays a $12,000 insur- 
ance premium on a policy that is owned by his son, the father has made a 
taxable gift of $2,000 ($12,000 less the $10,000 annual exclusion). 
Taxation of  Farm Property and Closely Held Businesses 
As explained in the text, an executor may elect to have certain real property 
used in farming and other closely held businesses valued at its current use, 
rather than at fair market value,  for estate tax purposes.  The election effec- 
tively lowers the estate tax burden on family farms and other family-owned 
businesses. In addition, where the estate is illiquid, the tax may be paid, with 
interest, over a fifteen-year period. To the extent that the interest rate charged 
is less than the heirs’ opportunity cost, this can present a substantial deferral 
advantage. 
Generation-Skipping Ransfers 
In  1976 Congress created  a generation-skipping  transfer  tax  to apply to 
transfers that deviate from the normal succession of bequests by skipping one 
or more generations. Prior to  1977, trusts were used frequently to effect gen- 
eration skips, because the death of a life beneficiary  in the trust did not nec- 
essarily create a taxable transfer to the trust’s remainderman. Pechman (1987) 
presents evidence that in the 1940s and 1950s more than 60 percent of million- 
aires in the United States transferred  at least some of their property in trusts 
and trusts  accounted  for more than one-third  of  the value of  noncharitable 
transfers by millionaires. The 1976 legislation effectively taxed the assets in a 
generation-skipping trust at the marginal estate tax rate of the life beneficiary. 
The Tax Reform Act of  1986 simplified this tax by imposing the tax at a flat 
rate, independent of the tax status of the life beneficiary. The 1986 legislation 
also extended this tax to apply to direct generation  skips (outright gifts that 
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This tax subjects generation-skipping transfers to a flat rate of tax equal to 
the highest rate of  the estate tax (currently 55 percent) after allowing a $1 
million exemption per taxpayer. A gift from grandparent to grandchild is po- 
tentially subject to both the gift tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax. 
If  the  grandchild’s parents  have  predeceased his  or  her  grandparent,  the 
generation-skipping tax does not apply. The generation-skipping transfer tax 
is imposed only once per transfer. The tax liability created by  a gift from 
parent to great-grandchild  is no different than the tax liability created by a gift 
from parent to grandchild. 
Composition of Wealth of Decedents in the United States 
In the main text we presented data on the composition of wealth of dece- 
dents from estate tax returns filed in 1985.  Tables 10B.l through 10B.7  pre- 
sent comparable data from estate tax returns filed in 1977,  1982,  1983,  1984, 
1986,  1987,  and 1988.  It is important to note that in 1981,  as discussed above, 
substantial changes were made to the estate tax, some of which were not fully 
phased in until 1987. 282  Thomas A. Barthold and Takatoshi Ito 
Table 10B.l  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1977 
Returns  Value 






State and local 











Funeral and administrative 






Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
State death taxes 
Federal gift taxes 
































































48,201.7  100.0 
12,920.9  26.8 
3,897.8  8.1 
730.9  1.5 
1,260.3  2.6 
1,192.5  2.5 
714.1  1.5 
12,483.6  25.9 
1,010.3  2. I 
8,444.3  17.5 
1,736.0  3.8 
2,683.0  5.6 
253.1  0.5 
1,538.7  3.2 
3,233.9  6.7 
28.065.4  58.2 
2,022.1  4.2 
2,649.0  6.2 
2,993.9  6.2 
9,952.4  20.7 
10,445.9  21.7 
1.9  0.0 
20,904.2  43.4 
6,172.0  12.8 
1,192.9  2.5 
552.3  1.1 
28.1  0.1 
523.6  1.1 
88.9  0.2 
4,979.1  10.3 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of  Income Division 283  Bequest Taxes and Accumulation of  Household Wealth 
lsble 10B.2  Estate 'IBX  Returns Filed in 1982 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 


















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 
Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
Unified 
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Table 10B.3  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1983 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 


















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 
Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
Unified 











































































































































~  ~ 
Source  Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division 
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Table 10B.4  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1984 
~ 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 


















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 
Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
Unified 








































































































































1.7  - 
9.3 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division. 
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Table 10B.5  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1986 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 

















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 





































































59,805  .O  100.0 
12,361.6  20.7 
17,029.1  28.5 
6,315.2  10.6 
321.6  0.5 
1,656.9  2.8 
3,927.9  6.6 
408.8  0.7 
6,853.3  11.5 
1,917.1  3.2 
1,866.2  3.1 
1,349.8  2.3 
2,069.9  3.5 
2,346.2  3.9 
7,696.7  12.9 
28,3  12.9  47.3 
177.4  0.3 
1,494.9  2.5 
533.6  0.9 
591.2  1 .o 
370.1  0.6 
2,941.7  4.9 
3,573.3  6.0 
20,125.7  33.7 
31,634.7  52.9 
438.4  0.7 
32,073.2  53.6 
12,074.4  20.2 
5,691.3  9.5 
4,243.1  7.1 
1,448.2  2.4 
6,383.1  10.7 
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Table 10B.6  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1987 
~ 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 

















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 
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Table 10B.7  Estate Tax Returns Filed in 1988 
Returns  Value 







State and local 
Corporate and foreign 
Cash 


















Adjusted taxable gifts 
Adjusted taxable estate 
Estate tax before credits 
Credits (total) 
Unified 











































































































































Source: Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division. 
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COmment  Ching-huei Chang 
I offer the following comments on Thomas Barthold’s and Takatoshi Ito’s pa- 
per. In terms of the first objective of this paper, they did a very good job in 
detailing the bequest (inheritance) and gift tax systems in Japan and the United 
States. But it seems to me this paper would  be more helpful  if the authors 
made a comparison between the two tax systems, rather than concentrating on 
the  institutional  elements.  Some important  questions  could  have  been  ad- 
dressed. For example, what are the two systems’ similarities and differences? 
What accounts for these differences? Do these differences have implications 
for variations in households’ bequest, saving, and other economic behaviors? 
My second comment is more on the U.S. tax  system than on the paper 
itself. It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between the two 
systems. Japan  treats  inheritance  and gift  taxes  as supplements  to income 
taxes.  The theoretical  basis  of  these  taxes is the concept  of  ability to  pay. 
Therefore, corresponding to the individual income tax, there are exemptions, 
a tax base, credits, and a progressive rate structure in the Japanese transfer tax 
system.  On the other hand, as Appendix 2 indicates, the United States treats 
these taxes as excise taxes on the transfer of wealth. If it is so, why does the 
United States use a progressive rate structure? As I understand it, progressive 
rates are usually related to the ability-to-pay principle. In the case of  an excise 
Ching-huei Chang is a research fellow of  Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philos- 
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tax, there may be different rates for different commodities or services, depend- 
ing on price elasticities in demand. I do not see any justification  for using a 
progressive rate system in estate and gift taxes. 
Third, Ito and Barthold point out in section 10.4.1  the loopholes in Japan’s 
transfer tax system, loopholes created by relying on the number of statutory 
heirs, rather than true heirs, in calculating liability for inheritance tax. They 
also provide a set of statistical data that reveal a positive correlation between 
the size of an estate and the number of statutory heirs. An estimate of the size 
of the distortion, however rough it is, would make a great contribution to our 
understanding of how serious the problem is. An estimate of the size of  the 
distortion caused by the use of real estate would also be useful. 
Finally, if I understand the paper correctly, Ito and Barthold seem to imply 
that the fact that at least one-third of household assets in Japan and the United 
States  are  obtained  by  intergenerational  transfers  is  against  the  life-cycle 
model of saving.  But  suppose that a person  saves in the way the life-cycle 
model predicts; that is, he accumulates wealth during his working period and 
plans to consume the total amount of wealth after he retires. Due to an unex- 
pected accident, however, he dies earlier than he expected. Thus he leaves an 
estate to his daughter. Statistical data show us an intergenerational  transfer of 
wealth, which is evidence against the life-cycle saving behavior, but, in fact, 
the person followed the life-cycle model. Of course, this is only a hypothetical 
example, but it may have some relevance to any policy  implications  drawn 
from statistical evidence. 
Comment  Hiromitsu Ishi 
This ambitious paper  addresses a difficult issue that many  economists have 
attacked. Although the arguments need strong reservations to be accepted by 
other economists, this seems to be a pioneering paper. 
Statistics of inheritance tax are only one available data source to estimate 
bequest assets transferred from one generation to another. However, coverage 
of the inheritance tax data is so limited that anyone would hesitate to attempt 
such an empirical study. In fact, the ratio of decedents shows only 5 or 6%  are 
taxable in Japan, and consequently some technique is required to expand the 
sample data to full, nationwide coverage of bequest transfers. 
Thomas Barthold  and Takatoshi  Ito begin  with  a detailed  explanation of 
inheritance and gift tax structure.  In addition, they explain a little bit about 
the  current  situation of  land issues in Japan  in connection  with the  inheri- 
tance tax. 
In this paper, the most crucial point is how to handle bequests from nontax- 
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able decedents, because the tax data never cover this type of bequest and this 
amount must be substantial.  Barthold  and Ito use a “k ratio” hypothesis  by 
which the maximum basic exemption is multiplied. If k is 50%, it means that 
half the basic exemption was left by a nontaxable decedent for his or her heirs. 
Since it is impossible to get directly an accurate value of k, Barthold and Ito 
give various values between  1.0 and 0 on an ad hoc or arbitrary basis. As a 
preliminary approach this rough procedure might be permitted, but they might 
make more effort to determine the k value within a certain significant range, 
not relying on guesswork. 
May I propose a couple of enhancements to the reliability of the k value? 
First, the authors haven’t already done so, they should interview tax collec- 
tors or tax  assessors  in  the division  of  inheritance  tax  at the  National  Tax 
Administration.  I think one could obtain some useful information about the 
bequest of a nontaxable decedent. This is merely an indirect approach. 
Second,  they  might  address  the  time period  of  institutional  change.  For 
instance, in 1974 and 1988, basic exemption levels were greatly raised, from 
one threshold to another. If one compares the number of taxpayers and other 
related data in two successive years before and after tax changes, one might 
gather some information about untaxable bequests, which are dropped from 
the new tax code. This is imperfect information but useful. 
Third, I think the k value must change depending on business conditions, 
in particular on land price variations.  During periods of higher land prices, k 
may be reduced. Therefore,  the estimation period might be divided into two 
or three variations of land price, instead of using one period of 1976-88. 
I would like to add one more point, apart from the k ratio issues. In conclu- 
sion Barthold and Ito stress that at least one third of household assets in Japan 
and the United States are obtained by intergenerational transfers, as opposed 
to life-cycle lump-sum saving.  In spite of their painstaking  estimates,  they 
might need to explain further, to strengthen their position. In order to reject 
life-cycle saving behavior, is the value of one-third enough? Is there a critical 
percentage  that would be  more convincing,  say 40  or 50%? What  kind  of 
theoretical  implications can Barthold and Ito derive from their estimated re- 
sults? How do they explain the same ratio of bequests in the United States and 
Japan, given different levels of household savings? 